For the past few years i have been thinking about how ancient philsophical wisdom might be employed to shed light on modern psychotherapeutic theory and practice. In this presentation you can hear some of my ideas on this subject- drawing on an argument from Plato’s ‘Euthydemus’ and Epictetus’s ‘Discourses’ to build my case for an improved approach for the use of CBT.
Courtney Shipley.
Courtney Shipley
The cosmos is a living being: The cosmos is a whole being- The appearance of parts is a way of viewing things and not at all a reflection of things as they are. When we look at a river, we may see different parts; turbulence here, stillness there, ripples, reflections- we may say that that part of the river is saltier or siltier. We have the view that the river is a divided being but in fact its ‘parts’ bleed into each other- the river is a flowing, continuous whole whose parts blend into one another and yet stand out as definable and identifiable features. Nonetheless, we could not pluck one eddy from the river, for the eddy is just a movement within the body of the river.
But as a heuristic, we can say that the cosmos has the appearance of discrete parts, and we can work with this appearance yet remain aware of its heuristic status.
In this article I want to make a few observations about the use of metaphor as a way of looking. I am suggesting that our metaphors are methods by which we might begin our philosophical enquiries. These ways of starting out take us on to new discoveries about the world and to conclusions that we might draw about our own place in it. As such, the metaphors that we take seriously, play an important role in informing the methods we develop that go on to shape our ‘selves’ and our interactions with other. Once our metaphors are well drawn, we might be in the position to cross reference our worldview with others and find helpful synergies. With this idea in the background, I’d like to consider the overarching metaphors used by the influential psychologist Carl Rogers, and those that resonate with or appear in Stoicism.
Carl Rogers was an American psychologist who was influential in the development of Humanistic psychology and was the founder of the ‘Person-Centred Approach’. His influence has had a profound effect on the development of modern psychotherapies. It was Carl Rogers who emphasised the importance of creating an empathetic and supportive therapeutic relationship with the client. He spoke about the importance of the therapist being as fully themselves as possible. This idea of genuineness and authenticity is a corner stone of psychotherapeutic practice today and is a basis for establishing a healthy client-patient relationship. It is also Rogers indelible mark on psychotherapy, when we hear of the necessity to treat clients with empathy and unconditional positive regard. Even in the fact that we speak of ‘clients’ rather than ‘patients’, we see evidence of Rogers influence, given his emphasis on positive, affirming and client empowering language.
Rogers’ influence is apparent in many forms of talk therapies, including Schema therapy, Gestalt, Humanistic-Existential therapies, Motivational Interviewing and has elements in Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy. We also can see his legacy in Positive Psychology, which develops the Rogerian view that client autonomy and empowerment is central to the pursuit of a happy and fulfilling life.
Rogers’ theory is more a way of seeing the world- of which metaphor and experience play a central role in this formation. Of his theory, Rogers says, “the facts are friendly” (1953/67, p. 25) and theory is attempt “to contain and explain the observed facts” (1951, p. 481). Theory “must follow experience, not precede it” (1951, p. 440). Rogers’ ideas were established in his experiences growing up on a farm, giving him a love of nature, an appreciation for the objective methods of science and an awareness of the importance of practical results. Despite his interest in an objective science however, Rogers appears to critique the methods of the experimental psychologists of his time. His foundational view that human life is not so different from all other organic life and is directed towards constructive ends by actualising and formative tendencies opens the way for a new (yet old) perspective. The metaphor underpinning the theory is descriptively organismic; that the human being is an organism that is directed by forces within its own nature toward its self-fulfilment. Such a fulfillment is not viewed in terms of pleasure but in the wholistic actualisation of the self- that the innate striving in us is towards our best potential selves. This teleological view is based on metaphors provided by nature, starting from the view that just like a plant we grow up towards the light, and that a healthy environment is analogous to appropriate nutriment in the soil and water surrounding the striving little plant. Importantly, nature is benevolent in Rogers’ view and there seems to be no hint of an original defect in the organism. The impetus for its development is ‘good’ and appropriate for the organism. The result of Rogers metaphor is a view that treats human beings as growing towards their appropriate ends. Their striving is seen as natural and good and the therapist’s role is to be as genuine and caring as possible, to completely support the persons impetus by providing a normatively healthy and positive environment that allows the person to shed restrictions and to grow towards their potential.
Part of the reason I would like to present Rogers views alongside Stoic ones, is that there has been a long-standing emphasis on the similarities between Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (and REBT) and Stoicism. In the background here I want my reader to be aware of the different metaphors at play and to consider the role they play in making a theory therapeutic in delivery. At the heart of CBT is arguably a mechanistic metaphor that might account for Stoicism as a set of techniques that can be used to deconstruct our inner mental life, whilst making little reference to the ways in which human life is intimately embedded in social structures. The result of such metaphors (if that’s what they are) might be, as we see in the Cartesian critique (e.g., Foucault, 1988; Husserl, 1960), a human being abstracted from its lived context. One that is temporarily effective at reducing distress by actively disputing and creating alternative cognitions. And as Descartes’ cogito, we find a being who with the death of God has been decoupled from reality and still waits to be replanted in new and fertile soil. Our modern and mechanistic human being might be deprived from a deeper awareness and commitment to the lifeworld it inhabits. We see both in Rogers own views and that of traditional Stoicism a stark contrast to this view and it seems wise to me (as a biased lover of Stoicism), to make sure our metaphors are ones of life, and necessarily vibrant and vital. That they commit us to engage in a living world that supports us and is benevolent and giving of our every need. After all, it takes only a little bit of awareness of our condition as rational beings to deeply appreciate what we have been give by nature. As Epictetus says in his ‘Discourses’-
“This body does not belong to you, it is only cunningly constructed clay. And since I could not make the body yours, I have given you a portion of myself instead, the power of positive and negative impulse, of desire and aversion – the power, in other words, of making good use of impressions. If you take care of it and identify with it, you will never be blocked or frustrated; you won’t have to complain, and never will need to blame or flatter anyone” (1.1.11-12.).
What we do with such an awareness is ‘up to us’ and we can go in either direction depending on what the world means for us. Whether we are aloof and just shoring up our own resources so we can maximise our own individual benefit- or whether we see ourselves as a part of a whole, deeply embedded and with complex commitments to those around us. In this last view we are not ever separate from our world, the impressions we have of things are not irrelevant but rather, the views we take of things form the diagnosis for the state of our soul as a being-in-the-world. This latter view I take to be the authentic one and a normatively healthy perspective.
I agree with the position put forward by Carl Rogers in his 1979 paper ‘The Foundations of the Person-Centred Approach’, which seems to me to resemble in some useful ways Stoic physics. His view, which he considers derived from real world investigation (observations of his clients in psychotherapy), is that there are two related tendencies which act on organic life and loom so large in his estimation of their importance that he considered them to be the “foundation blocks of the person-centred approach” p. 98.
Briefly, the first of these, the ‘actualising tendency’ is characteristic of all organic life. Of this tendency Rogers says, “there is in every organism, at whatever level, an underlying flow of movement toward constructive fulfilment of its inherent possibilities. In man, too, there is a natural tendency toward a more complex and complete development” p. 99.
Regardless of the type of living creature, oak tree, earthworm, or man- this tendency is characteristic of all organic life. Life is an active process, never passive: its behaviour “can be counted on to be in the direction of maintaining, enhancing, and reproducing itself” p.99.
Furthermore, even under the most unfavourable conditions, behaviour can be understood as a movement towards the objectives of life. Speaking of some of his most unfortunate patients Rogers noted that, “So unfavourable have been the conditions in which these people have developed that their lives often seem abnormal, twisted, scarcely human. Yet the directional tendency in them is to be trusted. The clue to understanding their behaviour is that they are striving; in the only ways they perceive as available to them, to move toward growth, toward becoming” p. 99.
And it is not merely that the living being’s growth tendency is toward all of the potentialities of the organism. The being is selective about what potentialities are constructive, for example it does not “tend toward developing its capacity for nausea, nor does it actualise its potentiality for self-destruction, nor its ability to bear pain… It is clear that the actualising tendency is selective and directional, a constructive tendency if you will” p. 100.
There appears to be in all organic life a movement towards its appropriate ends, in other words the living being is governed by ‘selective and directional’ processes; directed towards its telos. The Stoics had a similar understanding of basic drives regarding the constructive directionality of organic life and like Rogers- the Stoics were able to take these observations and apply them in practice. In De Finibus III, Cicero reports the view held by the Stoics describing it as-
“… the first appropriate action (for that is what I call kathekon) is that it [i.e. the agent] should preserve itself in its natural constitution; and then that it should retain what is according to nature and reject what is contrary to nature”.
Also, in Diogenes Laertius VII we see the same idea expanded to include a more definite description of activity toward the being’s appropriate ends-
“They say that an animal’s first [or primary] impulse is to preserve itself, because nature made it congenial [oikeios] to itself from the beginning… for in this way it repels injurious influences and pursues that which is congenial to it” (Inwood & Gerson, 1997, p. 191).
Such an organismic perspective helps to understand human behaviour (no matter how strange) as a striving towards becoming and identifies a very real ethical ground for coming to the aid of others, clearing away obstacles to their striving. However, as Stoic philosophers, we hold the view that the human being, has moved beyond the demands of merely biological ends, and as a rational creature is now governed by rational ends.
Therefore, our ethical commitments to others would likely involve removing obstacles to their own understanding of the use of reason. Given that reason cannot be restricted by external things, the kind of obstacles we are talking about must be self-imposed. As part of the whole, we act relationally upon one another- the Stoic philosopher, then, acts within their community as a being who supports the right use of reason- and they do this in a manner that respects the rational integrity and autonomy of others. The Stoic fortified by his care of others, sees clearly enough the cause of failings and refrains from condemnation as cure. As Epictetus points out in the ‘Discourses’-
“What grounds do we have for being angry at anyone. We use labels like ‘thief’ and ‘robber’ in connection with them, but what do these words mean? They merely signify that people are confused about what is good and what is bad… ‘Well, shouldn’t we do away with thieves and degenerates? Try putting the question this way: ‘Shouldn’t we rid ourselves of people deceived about what’s most important, people who are blind- not in their faculty of vision, their ability to distinguish black from white- but in the moral capacity to distinguish good and bad. It is as if you were to say, ‘shouldn’t this blind man, and this deaf man, be executed?’” (1.18.3-6.)
Epictetus points the finger back at the one who blames and suggests that it is their own evaluations that compromise their own rational integrity, that if we could safe guard the use of reason then we would be content in all things and more effective in our capacity to care. In so doing he makes clear that our care for self, the importance we place on our own wellbeing, is the same kind of care we should have for others.
One short coming of Rogers’ conception of the ‘actualising tendency’ is that it does not go far enough in the direction of appreciating the importance of the rational life to the human being. Such a being indeed strives- but we should recognise that the motivation for this directionality is found in an innate awareness of the good. The being qua rational, has developed an awareness of itself and the part of itself most obviously like universal Reason is individual reason. This ‘part’ gives us the capacity to use reason to conduct our affairs in the world according to Nature. The source of the good is not merely within us, and it is neither solely in the world, but rather the good lies in the correct use of reason in response to the world. This view gives us insight again into the proper conduct of the Stoic philosopher; seeking not avoidance or denial of the world, nor unwise commitments to external things but rather knowing that there is a unity made between their own use of reason and worldly objects- and that this unity is good.
The second tendency observed by Rogers, he calls the ‘formative tendency’. This is a principle in the universe that operates counter to entropy and is seen as “the ever-operating trend toward increased order and interrelated complexity evident at both the inorganic and the organic level. The universe is always building and creating as well as deteriorating. This process is evident in the human being too” p. 102.
Here, Rogers appreciates the appearance of our human consciousness and rational capacity as an example of this development towards complexity. His evaluation of human consciousness as an extraordinary peak of development in nature is an observation he shares with the Stoics. Further, he draws particular attention to the role of our ability to focus conscious attention-
“The ability to focus conscious attention seems to be one of the latest evolutionary developments in our species. It is a tiny peak of awareness, of symbolising capacity, topping a vast pyramid of nonconscious organismic functioning. Perhaps a better analogy, more indicative of the continual change going on, is to think of the individual’s functioning as a large pyramidal fountain. The very tip of the fountain is intermittently illuminated with the flickering light of consciousness, but the constant flow of life goes on in the darkness as well, in nonconscious as well as conscious ways. It seems that the human organism has been moving toward the more complete development of awareness. It is at this level that new forms are invented, perhaps even new directions for the human species. It is here that the reciprocal relationship between cause and effect is most demonstrably evident. It is here that choices are made, spontaneous forms created. We see here perhaps the highest of the human functions” p. 102.
This observation regarding the importance of conscious attention and the role it plays in rational activity is deeply shared by the Stoics. As part of their particular tool kit, the Stoic philosopher takes ordinary conscious awareness and turns it into a spiritual discipline. Epictetus tells us to
“Direct aversion only towards things that are up to you and alien to your nature, and you will not fall victim to any of the things that you dislike… Restrict yourself to choice and refusal; and exercise them carefully, with discipline and detachment” (Ench. 2).
The Stoic philosopher strives to remain aware and vigilant of their use of reason; they watch as impressions arise and screen out any evaluative beliefs (especially of the type that make external things appear to have inherent moral value). Constant vigilance is required in the case of the Stoic, who recognises the difficulty faced by the rational being who is unable to effectively direct attention.
Rogers alludes to the importance of the rational capacity yet in the end, unfortunately underplays the role of conscious attention, or perhaps he is unaware of any such intervention to strengthen it (or make its use a central activity in itself). He makes the point that-
“With greater self-awareness a more informed choice is possible, a choice more free from introjects, a conscious choice which is even more in tune with the evolutionary flow. Such a person is more potentially aware, not only of the stimuli from outside, but of ideas and dreams, and of the ongoing flow of feelings and emotions and physiological reactions which he senses in himself. The greater this awareness, the more surely he/she will float in a direction consonant with the directional evolutionary flow” p. 105.
Rogers is in clear agreement with the Stoics, that conscious attention, attention to self-awareness is required for the human being to be able to formulate choice. Being free from introjects means that the person knows what is ‘their own’ relative to ideas and stimuli taken in from the environment and operates from a sense of rational integrity. Having conscious attention differentiates the being from the ‘outside’ world; it knows itself as a cause of its own activity and is able to therefore act autonomously.
Rogers seems happy enough with this kind of choice without saying more about any other requirements. We are told that the human needs only a minimally supportive environment because the actualisation tendency will lead them in the positive direction toward their organismic goals.
The Stoic philosopher on the other hand, is not yet so optimistic. As previously discussed, the philosopher must manage ongoing attention- in fact, to make it a habit of life- constantly mindful that a tendency exists to confuse apparently good choices with good rational activity. Epictetus, after giving counsel on the use of continual practice and the formation of good habit, advises, “Don’t let the force of the impression when first it hits you knock you off your feet; just say to it, ‘Hold on a moment; let me see who you are and what you represent. Let me put you to the test’” (Diss. 2.18.24)
So far, I have attempted to outline some of the similarities shared by Carl Rogers and the Stoics. Rogers found great success as the founder of the ‘person-centred’ theory, and we can learn much from a study of his method. However, I argue that Rogers’ view underestimates the ultimate role of human reason. His excessive faith in the actualising tendency to inevitably produce good results, fails to take into account the observations that the Stoics make, that good activity (and associated wellbeing) is dependent on beliefs and that disciplined vigilance is probably required given the ubiquity of impressions. Rogers gets us part the way there by suggesting that there are internal drives towards ends, but he ignores the cognitive dimensions of rational nature, and fails to notice that beliefs can be mistaken. As a result, Rogers seems unaware that beliefs are routinely misused- for not only do we misuse reason ourselves (the ultimate cause of our troubles) but that also, systems and institutions that wish to govern their people can just as easily shape belief and influence common opinion. Belief unregulated by a normative reason, will result in the acceptance of a world that is not in accord with Nature.
Rogers’ approach to therapy, being significantly influenced by a cosmic view similar to that held by the Stoics may however be a rich vein to mine. His theory brings with it the necessary use of the highest human relational attitudes- unconditional positive regard and a deep respect for all rational beings. His method provides insightful clues for understanding the worldview of those we live with and teaches us to listen more effectively and in so doing being more able to respond to the fears and concerns of others. We can do all this with Rogers’ method and used alongside the Stoic insight regarding the central role of reason in discerning the good, we can ensure that we make the best use of reason in our interactions with others. In short, we will “never be blocked or frustrated; never need to complain, and never will need to blame or flatter anyone”. Stoicism has much to offer as a philosophy of love and care, but Rogers makes that explicit and shows us exactly how to do just that.
Finally, just as heuristics allow us to present appearances in a new light and offer new inroads for exploring ideas, so do metaphors. Rogers favours organismic metaphors, speaking in terms of growth and striving- suggesting that therapeutic encounters are curative given the fertile soil of the therapeutic environment (including the genuineness and positive regard of the therapist themself). But such metaphors may fall short when the focus on organic growth is at the apex of the developmental spectrum. Plants and non-rational animals differ from us precisely because of our capacity to reason. The great leap forward is to realise that unlike much of organic life, we are required to reflect on the use of reason and to critically examine our beliefs about ourselves and the world we inhabit.
I have used the metaphor of a river as it encourages me to conceive of human life, like Rogers, from a cosmic and natural perspective, but unlike Rogers and more aligned with Stoic physics, the world as ‘river’ is seen as a flowing unity of which its parts are inseparable from the whole. If I am but a ripple of self-awareness moving in the current, then I will flow wherever the river takes me. Perhaps I will make it around the next bend… we will see, but either way I hope to be happy with whatever comes my way.
Such a conclusion echoes the view put forward by Epictetus, who using the vibrant, lively metaphor of communal life, speaks of the festival goer, “a few people in the crowd are capable of reflection; what is this world, they want to know, and who runs it?… That’s what occupies a few, who spend all their spare time seeing and learning as much as they can about the festival before the time comes to get up and leave” (Diss. 2.14.28).
In all cases our metaphors are part of the substrate of our souls and their products take real form in the world in the ways in which we care for ourselves and others.
References
Cicero, M. T., & Rackham, H. (2018). De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA02821500
Epictetus, & Dobbin, R. F. (2008). Discourses and selected writings. http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA87185317
Foucault, M., Martin, L. H., Gutman, H., & Hutton, P. H. (1989). Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault. Contemporary Sociology, 18(1), 153. https://doi.org/10.2307/2072021
Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian meditations. In Springer eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4952-7
Inwood, B., & Gerson, L. (eds) (1997) Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company
Rogers, C. R. (1951) Client-Centred Therapy. London: Constable.
Rogers, C. R. (1967) ‘This is me’ In On Becoming a Person (pp. 3-27). London: Constable. (Original work published 1953)
Rogers, C. R. (1979) ‘The Foundations of the Person-Centred Approach’ Education, 100,2, p.98-107
Tudor, K., & Worrall, M. (2006). Person-Centred therapy. In Routledge eBooks. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203965252
Nature bestows reliable happiness
Her gifts made self-evident.
O Benevolence O Providence
Her mark appears on all things
As perceived by that ruling principle
She has disclosed to my heart.
Such gifts that are given,
This life, the most bespoke of treasures
Unfolding order, never unrequited, Amor Fati
She who has fitted this to that
And given me my beloved role to play.
O Benevolence O Providence
She who has perfected this world
And invited me to participate
In this festive season amongst great works,
O how I long to remain pious and gently touch
The marble of Her creation.
O Benevolence O Providence
And when by her esteem my own marble might chip
The pain of each stroke the sculptress’ blessing
For she reveals in me the character of my soul
And let it make her weep with delight.
In such trial her devotion is made clear
For, Nature has given me all that is required
And every talent and virtue to call on.
O Benevolence O Providence
You have made me many limbed
So that I may care for myself a thousand-fold,
In this clearing you reveal me to myself
And all torment is made tranquil.
O Benevolence O Providence
My cup runneth over,
Every good has found its way into my heart.
—Courtney Shipley.
EUDAIMONIA – TO SEE WITH THE DIVINE EYE (Part One)
I
A title with a strikethrough! A strikethrough that represents a prevailing attitude
in modern thought. The catechism of what is true and not. All true things must be
objects experiencible by some degree of measure. An object of influence cannot
influence in an unknown way, though we would have to ignore an “incredible”
amount of what we don’t know for this to be true.
What is rejected is often minutely defined within whatever constitutes the bulk of
one’s historical heritage, and that particular heritage may be one of polemic
polarities, in which there are assumed to be no new ideas.
Stoicism talks to us, in ways that have been presented admirably by modern
authors. It is an ancient heritage that has survived perhaps because of its
usefulness, its ability to inspire new generations. But is has always been wider in
its scope than many enthusiasts have been willing to accept.
Some of its ideas were all but lost, surviving in the fragments of friends and critics
with more lasting clout. Other ideas hide in plain sight, avoided by nervous
Christians in the renaissance and the early modern era. Still others have spurred
revolution, albeit through new schools of thought. But, it seems for each
generation only the most acceptable parts have been chosen. We seem to have a
different sort of eclecticism going on in our times, where certain basic Stoic ideas
have gained in popularity. But once again they’ve been cherry-picked to accord
with broader cultural tolerances.
To “see with the eye” is simply the physical eye’s function stated redundantly. But
more often we use ‘sight’ or ‘view’ as a metaphor for thought, the field of “vision”
being constructed in the mind. A “divine eye” is something different by its
addition, but a god is either not defined or it is defined, sometimes narrowly,
sometimes widely. But what is it to have a god of sorts? I would say its to see
existence as a kindred experience, but its clear that such a creating creature must
think differently, and for us to think of it, we must view it inside. It seems I’ve
struck through the wrong word! I took the liberty of striking the divine through
for your sake, when I should have struck through the eye. It is only the uneyed
view that can be “divine”, through the unsensual perceiver.
II
I’ve often heard it inferred that eudaimonia is the height of our existence, and in a
very shallow way that can mean “happiness”, but not in its typical modern range
of meanings: satisfaction, elation, or the absence of bad feelings.
Happiness as elation is a fleeting ‘up’ with its own relative ‘down’ in the lack of
elation, and being lead in a constant chase for it isn’t really conducive to real
happiness. Opinion and what we call “feeling” being the same thing, we can have
the opinion/feeling that we are satisfied with our circumstance, and the absence
of bad feelings/opinions may be a side-effect of this.
Eudaimonia is often reduced to more sustainable kind of tranquility, and an even
keel is preferable of course – whether in the midst of the crowd or in tranquil
platitude. But this is ataraxia, the preferred state of being across ancient
philosophies, Stoic, Epicurean, Pyrrhonist, whether Socratic, pre- or post-Socratic,
imperturbence both had and holds value today.
Another common interpretation of the term eudaimonia is “flourishing” (or
“human flourishing”), which has the sense of an opening flower, and I admit that
I’m critical of that particular inference of eudaimonia being something that
develops from one state to another. Although I can see that it’s a useful idea, I
don’t believe it’s an accurate representation of its meaning – particularly its Stoic
meaning.
I would say that, taking from ancient virtue ethics, there is a kind of happiness
‘ecosystem’, an optimal way to co-exist. A virtue of co-existence covered by two
different happenstances of the same thing: Like “duty” and “kindness”. These are
both expressions of providence, or virtuous forethought (phronesis). Duty as
represented by the Latin word officium is best understood in connection with the
rendering of a ‘necessary service’ whether the onus is upon you or it is done as a
kindness for someone else. That informs the sense of “duty”. An impromtu
kindness is a beneficium. If you ask me, I would say that “officia” and “beneficia”
are equal kindnesses, though I might suspect a modern preference for elevating
“beneficia” above “officia”. I suppose the idea is to give happiness in the form of
what might mirror one’s own expectation, and this giver can also be made happy
by the giving as well. This kind of happiness is known as “personal fulfillment”.
The longer history of the word “fulfillment” though biases more towards duty.
I’m using this as just one example of “virtue”, because virtue needs examples. It is
not simply an abstract state, a fixed halo. It is the lifeblood of human interaction.
There are a lot of terms that interchange awkwardly when attempting to describe
what the ideal state consists of. Each term representing a shifting context. Logos
is perhaps the most vague of all, but it has a high profile due to its use in the
Gospel of John “…and the Logos was God”, an almost co-incidentally Stoic
statement, logos representing the reason inherent in the universe.
If I were to break it down and describe the ancient Greek meaning of the term
eudaimonia though, it might also seem otherworldly to modern people, but it’s
something worth doing, because this is the same problem that other ancient Stoic
terms suffer from in the modern world.
“God” is perhaps the paramount example of a term that is widely misunderstood,
and you may reject it if you like, but I feel that it and its context should be
properly understood first, as it is related to the idea of eudaimonia.
“God” is a word which suffers from its almost unavoidable association with the
religions that came after Stoicism. But in Stoicism it is an hermeneutical term – it
has interpretive cachet, and deep psychological significance. It has been a
constant in the human mind in many ways, from the earliest recorded history
down to the present, and its many representations are a part of us in more ways
than one.
In modern secular understanding, ‘God’ is the supreme being that at one point in
the past mysteriously brought everything we know into being, but that we can
communicate with in our own mind. The various religious points-of-view may
bring many other ideas to this understanding that qualify it in a more particular
way, but that basic definition suits most religions of this day, especially those of
the monotheistic-exclusivist family most active vaguely west of India. Even the
polytheistic religions have creator Gods, they just might not be the same God you
communicate with (which is where Christianity dissembles into a vaguery in the
role of Jesus, a vaguery kept at arm’s length by dogma). In fact creation is more of
a function of myths in which a variety of scenarios can play creation out
haphazardly as a plot element. But when your God becomes the exclusive power
in heaven, that God creates alone and when invisible the God creates unknown.
III
Now in the modern world we are conscious of a greater knowledge of ‘the
universe’, of just how immense its expanse is, of how small and uncentral we are.
This creates a certain cognitive dissonance with the idea of an ostensibly human-
like God doing human-like things.
In the ancient world, religion revolved around the sacrificial cult, where the God
was not felt to be so distant at all. Gods and Goddesses were given gifts to seek
favour from them. This was the means of communication accompanied by formal
expressions of respect thought most likely to be acceptable. Gods being seen as in
a contractual relationship that was continuous and required a kind of regularity
that placed it within the regularities of nature that both Gods and people were
seen to be a part of. Gods resided over oaths, they were the third party there to
witness deals struck between human powers, being physically transported in the
form of statues that both parties would pay respect to. They were tied to cities,
one or many.
The divine also presided over the larger implicit contract of the people of the
cities themselves by being the givers of the gift of law, by which the
responsibilities were ordered which ensured the most co-benefit, and sought to
define what was ill-sought by proscription.
Plato often alludes directly to the governance of a city, most notably in the
Republic, but also throughout the dialogues (which are set in the city of Athena):
they are true laws inasmuch as they effect the well-being (eudaimonas) of those
who use them by supplying all that are good. Now goods are of two kinds,
human and divine; and the human goods are dependent on the divine, and he
who receives the greater acquires also the less, or else he is bereft of both.
Plato’s Laws 631b
The nomoi (laws) are seen as orthos, correct or reliable, thus agathos (good) is
what is truly reliable, and its reliability is seen as evidence of divinity. The benefit
being derived by all is eudaimonia, and it is supposed that a general eudaimonia is
possible so long as “true laws” prevail. so long as reliability isn’t being written into
circumstances by various motives. In Greek, idios is a private interest, those
persons attached to oneself, or an opinion – a private interest of the mind. An
idiotes is contrasted with a philosopher in possession of logic, or a professional in
possession of real knowledge. But idios can often prevail where least noticed. It is
part of the human. An in-group is capable of insinuating a different circumstance
to that which is real. In such cases, fate (tuche) as necessity can reassert itself, and
the real circumstance becomes knowable.
Jéferson Assumção in discussing the philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset, writes
“The communion of those who look at reality is able to show more”. Ortega in his
book The Rebellion of the Masses states that “man made up of mere idola fori
(‘idols of the forum’)..lacks…a self that cannot be revoked”. They are positing this
same distinction in my opinion, but there is always a mixture with some degree of
idios. Ortega’s most famous phrase is: “I am me and my circumstance. And if I
don’t save it, I don’t save myself” and circumstance at a greater elevation is
always shared, this is Ortega’s take on oikeiosis. Assumção writes that this
manifests “as an individual I-circumstance, an I-with-others that is also
immediately connected to the whole of society, the planet and what we don’t
know”, the last indicating that we are inevitably connected to things we know
nothing, or next-to-nothing about, but connected nonetheless.
I can see the relation between fate and circumstance. Circumstance is “fate” from
whichever view or timeframe we put on it. In Marcus Aurelius’ point of view, he
writes in Meditations (12.14) “either there is (before you) an alloted necessity and
unalterable order, or kind providence, or an aimless and unarraigned confusion.”
That’s my translation because I want to make clear that he’s putting experiences
into categories, not speculating on ultimate truth. All of these are true, and “fate”
is an experience, but behind it is an ephemeral and thus unknowable chain of
effects at the edge of knowledge.
There is another daimon-related word we come across in’ Meditations (1.16.3) in
a passage where he considers what he had learned from the previous emperor,
his adoptive “father” Antoninus Pius, who was said to have “No superstitious fear
of divine powers”. That superstitious fear is deisidaimonia, and it means ‘dread of
the divine.’ Plutarch echoes this assessment of its defect in De Superstitione (Ch2):
“superstition, as the very name (‘deisidaimonia’ -dread of deities) indicates, is an
emotional expectation (‘doxan empathe’) and an assumption productive
(‘poietiken hypolipsin’) of a fear (‘deous’) which utterly humbles and crushes a
man, for he thinks that there are gods, but that they are the cause of pain and
injury…the superstitious man is moved as he ought not to be, and his mind is thus
perverted…it bestows the added idea that He (or, the divine) causes injury…
superstition is an emotion (‘pathos’) engendered from false reason.”
The root of the deisi- element is deido – to ‘fear’ in the sense of becoming anxious
or alarmed, as opposed to the other sense of fear being reverence or respect.
They are insinuating the life of those who pay too much heed to omens, the ritual
involvements they require, and the supernatural dangers they imagine, and the
thousand ways they imagine to fail in appeasement.
The shadow of this assessment of divine injury, the vengeful God, can even drive
those who otherwise disavow religion to act as if they are in a struggle against
that power, but the struggle is as illusory as the mythological figure they seem still
to fear.
There is a problem of the over-dogmatic interpretation of oracles and events, and
the dissonance of feedback being the apparent ineffectiveness of remedies, an
anxiety that either drives them – or they are driven – to ever more ensuring
actions. There is the negative predictive horizon intimately related to the positive
predictive horizon, and both involve extrapolation from expectation (doxa).
A constant is the ineffectiveness of over-dogmatic interpretation. This is because
of the nature of fluidity, or we could say the fluidity of Nature.
Behind most fears hides the unknown, and this usually drives the search for
surety, which is both asked for and given in various ways.
If eudaimonia isn’t simply individual happiness then, it exists in a web of
interaction that includes the divine and is divine itself, at least as far as ancient
psychology is concerned. But is it simply something that happens to us and is
beyond our ability to affect? There have been many approaches to the divine that
strain to affect its presence. Philosophy generally critiques these hopes for
agency, and I believe that Stoicism critiques them by the standard of their use,
much like Psychology has at its most adventurous and perspicacious.
Interesting is Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s observation: “God speaks in
the imperative mode, but the strange neglected fact is that when men address
God…they speak in the imperative mood”, as a part of his assertion that “religion
is simply a huge attempt to build a world on the ground of an imperative of a
commandment.” God commands us, we command God.
My response to Agamben about the imperative mode is that it is an expression of
urgency that has probably from early times been used for pleading. The
conceptual power arrangement is something that may have come later, the
certain aloofness that we perceive today is the conceptual aloofness of God
himself, and this is tied to the aloofness of the sacred space and its class of
“employees”, as much as to the silence of God in the human realm. But the
formality of pleading has its reflective response in the formality of command. The
aloofness of the temple may have to do with the guarding of its secrets – physical
treasures stored there as a guarantor of contracts, of official records, of law and
the interests of the temple as an elite class.
I see a lot of the tension between the political assertions of “science” and
“religion” of the past two centuries that have influenced us to this day, as being
prompted by this somewhat continuing role of the “temple” in the early to mid
modern world, during which science emerged as the output of a new class that
did not want to be restrained.
But this tension was also present in the ancient world. The tension between
philosophy and the political regimes of which “religion” was a part.
In bringing in the political however, we come to a dead end. Because we have
been primed to think in terms of class tensions (tensions between political
actors), we can drift into dualism and be blind to the huge swathe of our output
that is not expressly political. Things of beauty and inspiration also found their
home in the “temple”, which also produced and preserved literature, poetry,
music, art, and wisdom.
I’ll backtrack to where I was explaining the hermeneutical focus. “God” as a
touchstone of deep psychological significance throughout human existence.
IV
A variety of scenarios have played creation out as a plot element in which one
God or another are involved often haphazardly in creation of the world around us,
but when your God becomes the exclusive power in heaven, that God creates
alone and invisibly. This we can see in the literary account of Genesis.
But the Stoic God is a philosophical development already present in the Socratic
heritage, which was being further developed in Stoicism. It represents that
creation, but the creation is from within. It is the power that manifests within
everything that changes, because it is that change and that constancy. It exists
both within us and within the things we depend upon for our existence, because
it has grown within this existence in the most appropriate way. This is both
providence and oikeiosis inherently (inherent ‘affinity’). The ‘nature’ (physis)
within us appropriates us to itself. It is no different to ‘nature’ outside of us.
Physis (“Nature”), being growth within us and amongst us, will strike its healthiest
path if we know what is “best”, what is arête or ‘excellence’ meaning virtue.
The divine is a way of explaining what is perfect around us, a hermeneutic.
‘Science’ and ‘psychology’ are great hermeneutics of our time, ‘science’ is a
hermeneutic of the perfect in objective truth by falsification, and ‘psychology’ is a
hermeneutic of the imperfect mind in search of better state, perhaps even the
perfect way; what is being interacted with is the object and subject of the human
mind, the uncovering of error (vice) and the discovery of virtue (or, what is best).
For Stoicism there is no distinction here between object and subject: It respects
proof, proposition, and true aporia, and directs all that is imperfect and subjective
in the human mind towards its underlying perfect state.
The reason there is philosophy at all is that people have cognitive dissonance.
They experience pleasures and prefer them to pains. They dislike the pains and
seek to avoid them, but if they cannot, they experience a further pain at the state
they are in. They are imperfect. Pleasures seem fleeting and they long for their re-
occurrence.
For Stoicism, there are two different categories, the human and the divine, and
the divine is part of what it is to be human. The human without the divine is little
more than another animal. In fact, the human can quite often be worse than the
animal, because humans can use some shade of reason to make themselves
worse. Humans have proven to be great organizers of death, for example, but also
act very effectively in support of life.
We have emerged with the necessary impulses that preserve us in our world, and
though these impulses can become abstracted from their best purpose, we know
that we have also emerged with an eye to what is better through a certain kind of
knowledge.
Some simulacrum of reason is the constant habit of the human mind, being really
just the way in which an individual finds and sustains themself in the society of
language, communication, and emotions. But pure reason is most fruitful of all,
and requires training (techne), and this the purpose that Stoicism attends to.
Our guiding soul (the one that uses pure reason) is akin to God as the pyr
technikon, the active principle seen to work in the manner of a fire, the trained
and training fire, an intelligence (noeron) built of process which is like a mind
(noos) at work in everything, whether manifest in a simple or a complex process,
the cause of motion held in check, it proceeds (badizon) step after step
compounding and reaching out, ‘orderly’ from a detached view. It generates what
can be considered as ordered (epi genesin kosmou) from a larger view. “epi/eph”
is the reaching manner, ‘towards’ generation. “eph’ hemin” (Epictetus’ Discourses
1.1) or “what is within our reach” being the ethos of growth or ‘nature’ (physis).
Faulty reasoning (or ‘vice’) is simply human, but good reasoning (or ‘virtue’) is
divine, and the divine, whether seen as ‘God’ or as some other ultimate, is the
category above what is simply human. It contains an idea of perfection that is
innate to us, but easily clouded over unless we are wise to what we should and
shouldn’t concern ourselves with. In many ways this idea of perfection informs
civilization as well.
The word “divine” in its Latin origin relates back to the word for “god” (deus), that
has branched out to many other languages from a very early common origin (The
Indo-European reconstruction is *deywos, which became Sanskrit deva as well as
Greek dia and zeus.) It is a group of words associated with the sky and its obvious
importance. The sky gives us sunshine and rain (English day and Latin dies are also
related to *deywos through the root *dyew – to shine). The power of life is
correctly seen to emanate from the power of the sky, but interestingly another
related word dives is used of land that is “fertile”, of people who are “talented”,
figuratively of “wealth”, of anything overflowing with life. The divine from above
is mirrored in the divine springing up from below. This is the psychological
significance at play, but there is a perceptible balance at play as well that we are
able to benefit from: a golden mean.
Within us there is assumed to be our daimon. A personal guiding spirit (our genius
in Latin). It is a kind of deity in itself, which should enlighten us as to what deity is.
It is the god within, being also what people are talking to when engaged in prayer
and other similar activities where this ‘presence’ is either felt or played with, but
one need not see it as separate at all, instead one may embody it. So it is
important that this presence is the right one.
A ‘good’ daimon is one that guides well or ably (eu-), and we could say conversely
that an able daimon (eu-daimon) is one that has been treated with reverence. It is
our own guidance as an harmonious part of the whole. Our affinity (oikeiosis).
Seneca shows that the very presence of the eternal is there within us if we only
realise. In Letters 41.1 he writes:
‘Prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est’
“God is near to you, is with you, is within.”
which I’ve translated to be as close to the Latin as possible. That’s “God is near to
you, God is with you, God is within” to be explicit.
In the next verse: “a sacred spirit (sacer spiritus) abides inside of us, a guardian
(custos) and an observer of our bad and our honourable deeds.”
Guardian, which is custos may also have the double-entendre of tutor. spiritus
could likely be interchangeable with anima (soul) in this period, as a word for the
life within us (literally: breath), but is here denoting the daimon, the sacer spiritus
being eudaimon, to use the adjectival form.
An interesting quote is then supplied by Seneca from Vergil’s Aeneid: “Who is the
god, it is undecided, but a god lives here.” It suggests that the identity of gods or
God is an afterthought, and may hint at the Stoic view of religion, when you
consider the start of 41.1: “We do not need…to beg the keeper of a temple to let
us approach his idol’s ear (aurem simulacri)”. As with names, so with images
(simulacra).
The external God acting in the universe but not of the universe* is a form of
simulacrum in itself, an idol. Plato’s distorted, as opposed to ‘faithful’
representation maybe. (* the Christians’ imperative for the individual to be “in
the world but not of the world” refers instead to the typical consensus of society,
and is worthy of Stoicism)
But the spiritus appears to be referring to something different to God (if indeed
anything is different to God). It is the indwelling spirit that is sacer, dedicated to
God, sharing in what is divine itself. So for Seneca there is this matter of
distinction, the same Stoic distinction understood by Epictetus in Discourses
(1.14.13-14):
“To what other guardian could he have entrusted us that would have been better
and more vigilant than this? And so, when you close your doors and create
darkness within, remember never to say that you’re on your own, for in fact, you’re
not alone, because God is within you, and your guardian spirit too. And what need
do they have of light to see what you’re doing? “
But God and the sacer spiritus are not necessarily two different things, just two
different contexts of the divine. The spiritus being particularised within the
person. I suppose that’s where the word “difference” is imperfect, because the
difference in this case, is the universal to the particular, and my opinion is that we
can’t make objects out of either of these, and I think that’s ultimately the
implication of the quote from Seneca, that “God is near to you, is with you, is
within.”
To illustrate (imperfectly of course), the energy in lightning is the same as the
electricity in a circuit board – that would not be unreasonable to say – but there is
a difference. But it really relates to the point of Letter 41, that when we act with
virtue we come closer to the knowledge of the divine within us. The sacer spiritus
in our life.
To quote a fragment of Chrysippus: “This is the very thing which makes up the
virtue of the happy person and the well-flowing life – when the affairs of life are in
every way tuned to the harmony between the individual divine spirit and the will
of the director of the universe.” or we could simply say the will of the universe
being the same as what directs it, from the largest to the smallest force. We are
now in the possession of minute relevance, and this specialisation objectifies
many things. In Stoicism there is a greater relevance presumed.
V
Once again: Is eudaimonia simply something that happens to us and is beyond our
ability to affect?
I’ll answer that in a round about way by saying that the bottom up distinction is to
do with our education in virtue. It’s up to us to keep that spiritus divine.
Within the earlier religious/literary ideas of the ancient world the greater
daimones are described as demigods, mortals created by the gods to live a godlike
life
without sorrow of heart, remote and free from toil and grief: miserable age rested
not on them; but with legs and arms never failing they made merry with feasting
beyond the reach of all evils. When they died, it was as though they were overcome
with sleep, and they had all good things; for the fruitful earth unforced bare them
fruit abundantly and without stint. They dwelt in ease and peace upon their lands
with many good things, rich in flocks and loved by the blessed gods. But after the
earth had covered this generation—they are called pure spirits dwelling on the
earth, and are kindly, delivering from harm, and guardians of mortal men.
Hesiod, Works and Days 115-122
(Hugh G. Evelyn-White translation – 1914)
after dying they were still seen to be dwelling on the earth for our benefit. As
tutelary deities they were honoured with rites but quite faceless compared with
the greater, immortal gods, who created them in this state.
Myths as part of the literary and dramatic output of the ancients were as relevant
or inspiring of philosophical reflection as that same output is relevant to
philosophy today, where we have the added dimension of film. But, there was
also a greater interaction with the forces perceived in “myth”, that of the ritual
life.
The gods represent collective psychological interactions with types defined by
that interaction itself. They are images arrayed with significant attributes and
their interplay contribute to an image of the world played out in myth, but it is
the very same in film and literature to this day. In the same way stories have
become attached to them as a form of entertainment that varies in its salience
according to the author. They may only be gratuities to the emotions that drive
the interest that they hold or they may have wider and more virtuous
significance. But regardless, they are ways of seeing ourselves. The significance of
motifs within entertainment are the food of philosophical involvement. What is
presented, both in stories and in the real that they interpret, can be shown by
another related word: daimonios – the ‘extraordinary’ and thus the ‘inscrutable’.
But for eudaimonia, which can be read as “blessedness”, to alight from the divine
in the form of the true good, there must be eu-daimonios, where the inscrutable,
the inscrutable path, the divine, or whatever is analogous to that state, is
‘revealed’. A state of guidance rather than becoming, because we already exist.
Daio, as the root of daimon shows that ‘what is daimon’ is ‘what is apportioned’.
Eudaimon is a state that is risen to, wherein the eu-daimon is the host, like at a
banquet, and what we “partake of” (dainumi in the middle/passive voice) is
knowledge as state of being, and thus in that state of being we are “host”
(dainumi in the active voice) to eudaimon reflexively.
This theme of the banquet presents a simile of the ethos of the times when
animal sacrifices to gods were an institution. One regular type of sacrifice was
when animals, dedicated to a god, were slaughtered and cooked in the temple.
The people present, being worshippers of the god, were served this meat as food.
The animals sacrificed in these cultures and in modern cultures where some
modicum of animal sacrifice persists, are those animals favoured as meat. (For
example, sheep and birds in Ancient Israel; and pigs, chickens, and ducks in China
to this day.)
There is a sense in which the bringing of an offering is assistance in the service of
the divine and what it represents. This is one way of seeing the “temple”: As,
instead of one’s own ‘body’ (as is canonically supposed), it can rather be other
people. We can bring assistance to others in their service of virtue. When one
brings assistance to another, both are brought closer to the divine. The example
of a “temple” being the oikeiosis (affinity) in its ‘ecosystem’ and economy.
I wonder about the relation between virtue and healing. People also go to
temples to seek healing, to be brought back to a state of health. This is a kind of
inversion, where something is sought of the divine. Of course though, healing is
within.
Just as this spirit is treated by us, in such a way it also treats us
Hic prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat.
— Seneca, Letter 41.2b
What we describe as religion was a very laissez faire affair in the pre-Christian
world, which we can see outlined in Philostratus’ Apollonius of Tyana. But this
even pertains within Christianity, Islam, and Judaism in the cults of Saints,
Sheikhs, and Ravs. It also reminds me of Hinduism to this day, and the various
Buddhist syncretisms of East Asia. There is a universality to these forms of
significance. But often they carry built-in critiques of temple fiefdoms and their
routine animal sacrifices. Critiques that you find not only amongst the
Pythagoreans, but in the Hebrew prophets of the Bible as well. That the divine is
of a common substance to our intellect and that virtue is its modus operandi, is
very much echoed in Stoicism, while in the Bible it is that God can be better
served or reached with virtue, and that virtue is God’s main desire.
We might say that the biblical or classically theistic God apportions rewards, and
the Stoic God shares in a substance with us that is its own reward. It is eudaimon,
being an apportioning of the divine, that nourishes the soul that holds it in
reverence.
VI
I’m displaying here an hermeneutical method for dealing with all that is involved
in the idea of the Stoic god, in as far as it relates to eudaimonia. But you may not
need this at all.
In as much as the revelation of ‘knowledge as eudaimonia’ works psychologically
to connect us to our more natural state of oikeiosis, that is: affinity with nature
and with fate in the form of circumstance, eudaimonia is also connecting us with
a truth that is like Kant’s noumena, which I’ll typify very basically as those things
that are real but remain hidden until known.
Truth is the goal of the journey from daimonios (what is obscure and unknown) to
that which becomes known through eudaimonia (that which guides well) by the
means of Stoic logic.
This is the path of science towards revelation of knowledge, by that which guides
us well enough to discover noumena previously hidden, and this too can be
eudaimonia – being (or Being) rightly guided by the faculties within ourselves
shown enough respect to be trained in the virtues that lead to truth.
There is another issue here though: That all of the virtues must be used, which is
to say that none must be neglected.
That will bring me to the next stage of this exposition, Part 2: where I’ll delve into
the significance of the story of Prometheus…
—-Khyel Walker, June 2023
We further discuss the ‘Discourses’ for our Brisbane Stoics meetup.
How, from the idea that God is the father of human beings, one may proceed to what follows
Today I will offer some of my thoughts on the next chapter of our readings. This time Discourses 1.3
Returning again to Christopher Gill’s observation concerning the grouping of subjects in the discourses…
“we can identify three subjects or clusters of subjects that are especially prominent in the Discourses. All three subjects are also important in other writings on Stoic ethics, though Epictetus’ treatment sometimes has distinctive emphases. One is our capacity for rational agency, and a second our capacity for ethical (especially social) development; a third is the idea that these capacities form key distinctive features of human nature within the framework of a divinely shaped universe.” p.xii.
It is clear from the outset that this short chapter is going to be concerned with Gill’s third theme, that our rational agency and capacity for ethical development “form key distinctive features of human nature within the framework of a divinely shaped universe”. Let’s jump into the text and see how this theme is put to use.
[ 1 ] If only one could be properly convinced of this truth, that we’re all first and foremost children of God, and that God is the father of both human beings and gods, I think one would never harbour any mean or ignoble thought about oneself.
In the commentary on this section Hard tells us “Stoicism regularly presents human beings, by contrast with non-human animals, as sharing rational agency with God”. Humans are thought to contain a spark of God within them, the rational part which gives us the divine power to employ reason to penetrate the appearances of things. Whereas, animals are thought to be mostly restricted to stimulus-response when it comes to dealing with the world as it appears to them, human beings armed with reason have the unique capacity to test ‘appearances’ or ‘impressions’. Humans have a unique aptitude for being able to create a gap between stimulus and response and to be able to fill that gap with the rational processes of critique and inquiry so as to ensure that the final judgements they assent to are in accord with things as they are and not projections of their own subjectively based wishes and fears, or other forms of ignorance and bias. The overarching point for the Stoics is that reason is the defining feature of man, otherwise he is merely an animal. This includes the idea that the cosmos is a rational being and that individually we are each a part of this overall being, and that the only commitment worth pursuing is the knowledge of what one is. From this the Stoics can say our only commitments should be toward a normative understanding and use of reason as opposed to commitments that would make things outside the domain of our rational autonomy valuable to us.
Simply put, we are Cosmic Reason made conscious, we are the use of reason. External things lay outside of the domain of our rational autonomy and should be used appropriately, which includes the awareness that they have no inherent ethical value in themselves. The only value they can have for us is in our normatively rational use of them.
This all sounds quite recondite, but a simple schema might go something like this
(image) –
Like the popular modern formulation, the danger of such a simple description is that it simplifies the philosophy to a simple technique which may be useful as a learning tool but does nothing to engrain the wisdom of the philosophy. Such a tool may indeed remind us to question impressions, which is a fundamentally requisite habit, but it does not adequately instruct us in understanding the deeper and transformational aspects of the philosophy. These shorthand descriptions might serve some useful heuristic purpose but we must be careful not to allow the device to operate for us. We must learn to ‘see’ in a certain way to identify with ourselves as beings of rational purpose and not merely ape or act out a method. Stoic philosophy must coincide with our conception of ourselves and operate from deep within and not be a mere activity of recall of the type Plato warns against when he speaks of certain types of writing-
“At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Thoth; the bird which is called the Ibis was sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters.
Now in those days Thaumus was the king of the whole of Upper Egypt, which is the district surrounding the great city which is called by the Hellenes Egyptian Thebes, and they call the god himself Ammon. To him came Thoth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he went through them, and Thaumus inquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. There would be no use of repeating all that Thaumus said to Thoth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when he came to letters, ‘This’, said Thoth, ‘will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; for this is the cure of forgetfulness and of folly’. Thaumus replied: ‘O most ingenious Thoth, he who has the gift of invention is not always the best judge of utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance a paternal love of your own child has led you to say what is not the fact; for this invention of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners’ soul, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. You have found a specific, not for memory but for reminiscence, and you give your disciples only the pretence of wisdom; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome, having the reputation of knowledge without the reality’”.
Plato, Phaedrus.
The point is that recall of writing or technical prescriptions may produce certain activities, but without knowledge it cannot produce virtue. This kind of resort to technique does indeed have useful consequences and are used in psychotherapy to reduce psychological distress but arguably, at the cost of their original purpose, as just part of a much broader set of activities designed to inculcate philosophical doctrine. John Sellars makes this argument in his article “Roman Stoic Mindfulness: An Ancient Technology of the Self”, definitely a worthwhile read.
The implications of this for Stoicism is that a reduction to a set of psychological techniques may reduce the utility of Stoicism, downgrading it to a modern set of psychotherapeutic practices aimed at decreasing psychological distress for the individual. Whereas, the goal of Stoicism seems more to me a critique of the ‘common opinion’ that unmediated judgement is an adequate guide to ethical life and that external things have value in themselves and are appropriate objects of desire. Furthermore, Stoicism focuses on our interconnection with others and our duties and obligations toward them, recognising the rational (and therefore divine kinship) that connects us.
This discussion, based just on a few lines of Stoic text and an appreciation for the larger themes at play presents us with a perspective that locates our rational capacities and ethical development within the context of a divinely ordered whole. Why would we seek to downgrade this noble and normatively healthy view of the cosmos and our place in it, reducing it instead to a series of practices that makes distress management the end goal. Epictetus directs us to imagine what life could be like if you knew that you were a child of the living Cosmos, you would never harbour any ignoble thought about yourself. Imagine what kind of life you could make for yourself if you understood the implication of what has been given to you, the capacity to use reason to get what you need to live well.
Lets see what comes next…
[2] Why, if Caesar were to adopt you, no one would be able to endure your conceit; so if you know that you’re a son of God, won’t you be filled with pride? [ 3 ] As things stand, however, we don’t react in that way, but since these two elements have been mixed together in us from our conception, the body, which we have in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence, which we share with the gods, some of us incline towards the kinship that is wretched and mortal, and only a few of us towards that which is divine and blessed. [4] Now since everyone, whoever he may be, is bound to deal with each matter in accordance with the belief that he holds about it, those few who think they were born for fidelity, for self-respect, and for the sound use of impressions will never harbour any mean or ignoble thought about themselves, whereas the majority of people will do exactly the opposite. [5] ‘For what am I? A poor wretched man,’ they say, or ‘This miserable flesh of mine’. [6] Miserable, to be sure, but you also have something better in you than that poor flesh. Why do you neglect that, then, and attach yourself to what is mortal? [7] It is because of this kinship with the flesh that some of us who incline towards it become like wolves, perfidious, treacherous, noxious creatures; or others like lions, wild, savage, and untamed creatures; or in most cases like foxes, or something even more ignominious and base. [8] For what else is a slanderous and ill-natured person than a fox, or something even more unfortunate and base. [9] Watch out, then, and take care that you don’t end as one of these wretched creatures!
As Hard points out in the commentary, the two elements referred to here are not meant to introduce a dualism that does not exist in Stoic theory but rather “Epictetus uses the contrast to mark an ethical distinction between using our rational agency in a way that reflects the aspiration towards virtue or in the opposite way”. p 307. So, what is at stake here is the consequences of the use of reason. Used correctly reason directs us in a life appropriate to rational beings- emphasizing our rational autonomy, ethical integrity and our liberation from misfortune. This use of reason takes what is natural to the rational being and applies them as the principles by which to live by, it is the equivalence of piety as living in accord with reason is same thing as making wise use of what is given by Nature. As we have previously discovered in 1.1 such a person has the power of “making good use of impressions” and “won’t have to complain, and never will need to blame or flatter anyone”.
On the other hand the person who fails to know the value of the rational capacities and who identifies merely with their body and seeks happiness in pleasure or in other externally contingent things is much more likely to be unhappy in life. But worse than that, the person who identifies worth with things that can be taken from them or that inevitably fail to satisfy our desires, must necessarily have the kind of false beliefs that open them up to the passions. They must look forward to emotional upheaval, the prospect of devastating and demoralizing loss, they will be in danger of feeling like victims or becoming vicious themselves. By misusing reason, a person has become much more like an animal. Their response to a stimulus has no intervening rational critique, there is nothing to stop them from applying false beliefs to impressions. The results are that the life they live is fraught, open to disturbance and destructive passion, the conclusions they draw from appearances are false realities and they have descended into a degraded life of delusion. Reality gives way to fantasy and the proper end of the human, his/her rational telos is truncated. At some inner level we must experience the cruelty we do to ourselves when we deny our selves the ability to live in the real world. Denial of reality is a slow death.
Freud theorised that our escapist behaviour was motivated by the conflict between the pleasure principle and reality- saying that the inner distress is reduced through the application of distraction, substitution or intoxication.
(Dr. Johnson- He who makes a beast of himself gets rid of the pain of being a man)
This observation is insightful, but rather than the discomfort being caused by a failure to satisfy libidinal needs I like to think that Stoic philosophy offers an alternative explanation. The rational being fails to understand its nature and its kinship with ‘Men and Gods’ and consequently fails to meet the requirements of reality. To contradict reality is a recipe for disaster, it is an anomaly, an aberration, a cancerous thing that needs to be excised.
Marcus Aurelius notices the same thing writing in his journal-
“The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the universe, so far as it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other things are contained.” Book 3.16
Failure to actualise our nature leads to a condition of existential distress. We have taken a thing of inestimable value and polluted it and at some level we know it. The slow torment the sensitive soul feels and the dense one denies requires it to find succour in distraction, substitution or intoxication. It is no wonder our culture has developed a myriad of ways in which a person can indulge themselves. Consumerism goes hand in hand with individualism to lance the boils and cauterise the tumours helping to manage our illness and prevent it from becoming a terminal condition.
Well that got kind of heavy. Sorry about that.
Too return to Epictetus’ metaphor, that people who are fixated on the pleasures and the body become like wild animals. This connection to stimulus and response and the misuse of reason we have well established but an older use of this metaphor is preserved in Plato’s Phaedo (and has a presumably Pythagorean origin). It goes beyond the concern for the immediate life of the person in question and has Socrates speculating on the consequences for the bearers soul-
“These must be the souls, not of the good, but of the evil, who are compelled to wander about such places in payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they continue to wander until the desire which haunts them is satisfied and they are imprisoned in another body…
Men who have followed after gluttony, and wantonness, and drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them, would pass into assess and animals of that sort…
And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and violence, will pass into wolves, or hawks and kites…
But he who is a philosopher or lover of learning, and is entirely pure at departing, is alone permitted to reach the gods”
The Stoics are not concerned so much with life after death as it appears Socrates may have been but they are indeed concerned with the state of the soul and that it should resemble that of a rational being – and not of a lesser creature. As I have explored, the argument is not ideological at all but rather based on the Stoic understanding of physics. That the world is as the world is and that we are the kind of being that can fit with the order of things or alternatively act contrarily. Our choice produces for us and through us either harmony or disharmony- this is a serious matter; the consequences are worth considering.
Epictetus was recorded by Arian as saying-
“on the subject of the gods, there are those who deny the existence of divinity outright. Others say that God exists, but is idle and indifferent and does not pay attention to anything. A third group says that God exists and is attentive, but only to the workings of the heavens, never affairs on earth. A fourth group says that he does attend to earthly affairs, including the welfare of humanity, but only in a general way, without worrying about individuals. And then there is a fifth group, Odysseus and Socrates among them, who say that ‘I cannot make a move without God’s notice.’
Discourse 1.12.1-3.
When Judith asked me to co-present this topic on the walled garden ‘understanding the stoic god’ I remember wondering what the hell I would have to talk about. But then I realised that it is one of the aspects of Stoicism that quite interests me, one that seems to provide plenty of controversy and contributes to the division between so called modern and traditional stoicism.
When I say im interested in the Stoic god as an aspect of Stoicism, I think I mean, that it has a tendency to loom into the foreground when im reading or thinking about topics in stoicism that interest me, otherwise, im sure the Stoic god may have remained in the background as a historical curiosity.
For example Im quite interested in learning about what the Stoics thought about responding to lifes difficulties. If you turn to any of the ancient writings that have survived you will find that the philosophical treatment at some point will invoke a providential perspective of the universe.
A case in point, Seneca dishes out practical advice in On Providence writing: “Avoid luxury, avoid effeminate enjoyment, by which men’s minds are softened” but such advice is given as part of a longer prescription in maintaining the health of the soul against the backdrop of a world in which happiness appears fleeting and in which suffering is likely and death inevitable. “God hardens, reviews, and exercises those whom He tests and loves” he writes. And drawing a comparison to an elite soldier who having been selected by a General for a particularly dangerous mission- and being pleased at the selection- Seneca tells us that we should say likewise, “God has thought us worthy subjects on whom to try how much suffering human nature can endure.”
Seneca’s advice is rather dramatic and in this text I think its appropriate to wonder how much Seneca’s God has in common with those of other Stoic writers or communicators. Turning to Epictetus, who early in life was a slave we often see similar language. In discourses 1.6 Epictetus asks his audience what would have become of Hercules if there had been no monsters to battle, “what would he have done in the absence of such challenges? Obviously he would have just rolled over in bed and gone back to sleep. So by snoring his life away in luxury and comfort he never would have developed into the mighty Hercules”. Epictetus instructs his audience that it is through crisis and difficulties that we call upon the virtues that have been given to us by Zeus, that it is in their utilization that we develop and discover who we are both in terms of ourselves as individuals and also in our larger purpose. In fact both Seneca and Epictetus lament the person who is unfortunate enough to never meet significant troubles. Where Seneca exhorts misfortunes role in testing our commitment to virtue, Epictetus focuses on misfortunes role in showing us what is ’up to us’. That is, for Epictetus our freedom is often showcased when misfortune come a knockin’. In 1.6 he says “Bring on whatever difficulties you like Zeus; I have the resources and a constitution that you gave me by means of which I can do myself credit whatever happens”… he reminds his audience “God has not merely given us strength to tolerate troubles without being humiliated or undone, but as befitting a king and true father, he has given them to us free from constraint, compulsion and impediment. He has put the whole matter in our control, not even reserving to himself any power to hinder us or stand in our way. And even though you have these powers free and entirely your own, you don’t use them, because you still don’t realise what you have or where it came from”. And in 1.12 instead of being put off at the appearance of misfortune he tells his audience that “you should thank the gods for making you strong enough to survive what you cannot control, and only responsible for what you can”.
In the last quote we can see that the issue is not merely dealing with misfortune. My original interest in finding out what these Stoics thought about building resilience or responding appropriately to misfortune has segued from practical techniques, advice about not allowing myself to get soft, to a view that is concerned with the discovery and development with an inner faculty that is always in my power regardless of the circumstances.
So in the Stoics, God has many simultaneous roles. God is presented as an immanent ordering principle that structures the regularity of the universe, God is a force that selects and tests the souls of individuals whilst at the same time being the whole body of the cosmos and everything in it. God appears as a benevolent exemplar and also as a creator who has given Humans a share of its nature- which accounts for their rational and moral freedom.
The question remains of course, whether we need the Stoic god to make sense of the Stoic worldview or whether we can disregard it as an irrelevant historical anthropomorphisation. It’s tempting to get rid of it and replace it with a more ‘scientific’ explanation, in the parts where doing so is required. So for example, instead of us being parts of a whole body, made by a providential being can’t we just replace oikeiosis with an evolutionary account. Likewise we can preserve virtue as a prosocial development, admittedly by watering it down and making one of many potential goods alongside pleasure and wealth where natural or social selection is concerned. Also, the human soul can be satisfyingly dealt with by making it epiphenomenal activity of our brains.
Probably this is the kind of view I had naively worked out before I encountered the Stoics. Reading the Stoics however gave me a point of contrast, I imagine it to be like having two different coloured circles of cellophane. The first coloured circle was the view that I had satisfyingly and fairly unquestioningly adapted from my culture, upbringing and experiences but when I held the new coloured circle up it showed up many of the imperfections in my default worldview. Such a view, gave me a profound sense of cognitive dissonance, that my scientific and biologically reductionist view was keeping me from a way of seeing that might increase my wellbeing and enjoyment of life.
As you can see I was draw to the Stoic worldview because in its philosophy I see a worldview that is fundamentally therapeutic, that is, it is the best possible account of a world worth living in. This sounds like a pragmatism and its efficacy might be assessed with this such a view in mind. But for the therapeutic account to be optimal it requires the belief in a living ordered and benevolent cosmos that shares a profound connection with each of us.
Such a cosmos gives one the confidence to completely let go of the fear of harm required to continuously live according to reason. A belief in providence is what consoles Marcus Aurelius, whilst meditating on the inevitability of discomfort and death he asks himself,-
“So what can serve as our escort and guide? One thing and one alone, philosophy; and that consists in keeping the guardian-spirit within us inviolate and free from harm, and ever superior to pleasure and pain, and ensuring that it does nothing at random and nothing with false intent or pretence, and that it is not dependent on another’s doing or not doing some particular thing, and furthermore that it welcomes whatever happens to it and is allotted to it, as issuing from the source from which it too took its origin, and above all, that it awaits death with a cheerful mind as being nothing other than the releasing of the elements from which every living creature is compounded. Now if for the elements themselves it is nothing terrible to be constantly changing from one to another, why should we fear the change and dissolution of them all? For this is in accordance with nature: and nothing can be bad that accords with nature.”
Meditations -2.17
Such a view allows Marcus to formulate and hold onto the idea expressed in 4.17-
“Remove the judgement, and you have removed the thought ‘i am hurt’: remove the thought ‘i am hurt’, and the hurt itself is removed”.
Recalling my coloured circles it easy to see the temptation for someone interested in therapy to gravitate towards such a view. We live in a time where trauma as a concern for psychological wellbeing has become common place. I don’t intend to comment on specific cases and I do appreciate that there are legitimate experiences and conditions that may cause acute and chronic trauma reactions, but one thing I have noticed about myself as I gaze through my contrasting coloured lenses is that the Stoic worldview fills me with a tremendous sense of relief and confidence in my ability to deal with difficulties. Over time I have come to believe that my fears are often groundless, and that there are few things that actually cause me harm and therefore worth being negatively concerned about. I trust that I am a part of a much greater living being and that my own personal preferences (although meaningful to me) are often capricious, sometimes mistaken and on rational reflection not ultimately particularly important. What matters to me when viewing reality through this lens is not how much stuff or how much fun I have, but what kind of person I can make of myself and how useful and genuinely caring I can be towards others. Seeing the world providentially helps me to do this. I don’t feel alone, I don’t feel disempowered, I feel free and I’m learning how to exercise that. A providential worldview, the kind the Stoics offer us also encourages us to reflect not merely on our freedom from misfortune but also on the responsibility required to use the rational faculty appropriately. Again without an appropriate ethical worldview, perhaps of the type provided by the Stoics conception of God it would be tempting to use rational freedom to be a narcissist or sociopath- a move potentially fitting in our contemporary hyper-individualistic consumer oriented society. Stoic rational freedom has a profoundly prosocial character as it views human individuality as but a trace of a much larger form of collective and universal reason.
As someone interested in the subject of psychotherapy, I early on stumbled across an article by Don Woollen Jr., a therapist who was proposing a stoic informed approach to Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). Woollen raised the issue that all therapists really have in relation to helping their clients. What am I helping the client to do? If we are treating psychopathological symptoms then what constitutes a cure? For the CBT therapist it may mean a cessation of symptoms and a return to prior normal functioning. But for the student of Stoicism the therapy that is required will have to inoculate them from the fear that any external thing can harm them, or even that any external thing has any moral value whatsoever, whilst simultaneously inculcating an awareness of our connection with others. The belief in providence as an active form of orienting to the world prevents the convalescent from drowning in their interiority and allows them to actualise their individual reason in a way that is much more likely to serve the needs of the broader community. The cosmic perspective also allows one to take solace in his or her own virtuous conduct as he pursues his rational ends and the actualisation of his own nature even as he or she experiences the upheavals and vicissitudes of life. As a therapist reflecting on the incredible resilience and strength of character of the ancient Stoics as it appears in the literature, Woollen writes-
“It is difficult to see how, in the face of apparent tragedy, one can maintain the level of equanimity espoused by the Stoics without also possessing their corresponding belief in a rational, providentially ordered, and benevolent universe. Yet, by drawing on the work of Seligman (1990) and his theory of learned optimism along with other insights from the positive psychology movement, it could perhaps be argued that such a belief, whether true or not, is demonstrably the most effective strategy for dealing with life’s vicissitudes and therefore, on Stoic grounds, the most rational attitude to adopt.”
The point made about positive psychologists is that optimists statistically fail to accurately predict outcomes (they tend to favour positive predictions despite contrary evidence) however optimism is correlated with better health, wellbeing and relationships. No one is here telling the optimists to quit inaccurately judging reality, in fact it’s quite the opposite. Given the clear benefits of optimism to health, wellbeing and relationships, researchers and therapists have endeavoured to find ways to teach optimism to less optimistic souls.
In the case of Stoicism we don’t even know if it’s not the case that the cosmos isn’t a living benevolent creature, yet the (ancient) literature makes the case that such a belief will prevent you from ever being harmed against your will. To quote Epictetus (speaking as Zeus)
“And since I could not make the body yours, I have given a portion of myself instead, the power of positive and negative impulse, of desire and aversion – the power, in other words, of making good use of impressions. If you take care of it and identify with it, you will never be blocked or frustrated; you wont have to complain, and never need to blame or flatter anyone”
Such a view may make us optimally rational and socially responsive, resistant to psychological disturbance, and promote profound feelings of connection and meaning. I guess we can become the Guinea pigs of our own experiment which starts with turning a sceptical eye to our own inherited worldview. I for one am keen to find out how much better life is living in a providential cosmos perhaps you will join me.
Courtney Shipley at Brisbane Stoics shares his presentation on ‘Care for the Self’, drawing on the work of Michel Foucault and A. A. Long. Here emphasis is given to testing impressions and the criteria set by preconceptions. References: Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault. (2022). University of Massachusetts Press. Long, A. A. (2002). Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (1st Edition). Oxford University Press
In our Brisbane Stoics meetup in March, we started exploring the Discourses.
In this video, I outline the core concepts of 1.2
Discourses: Hard Translation 1.2
How one may preserve one’s proper character in everything
Introduction
In my previous presentation concerning discourses 1.1 I included a quote from the introduction of the Hard translation by Christopher Gill. As we go along I will try to locate these themes in the text which might help to give some structure to my discussion. This is not to say that this is the only way of grouping themes but given my interest in a traditional presentation of Stoicism I will use Gill’s observations in that it includes the sometimes neglected reference to the rational beings distinctive features in a providentially ordered cosmos. Here is the quote again-
“We can identify three subjects or clusters of subjects that are especially prominent in the Discourses. All three subjects are also important in other writings on Stoic ethics, though Epictetus’ treatment sometimes has distinctive emphases. One is our capacity for rational agency, and second our capacity for ethical (especially social) development; a third is the idea that these capacities form key distinctive features of human nature within the framework of a divinely shaped universe.” p. xii.
My approach to the reading going forwards will be to break them into parts, where appropriate and offer some discussion about what might be going on. I would like to emphasise that I am merely a student of Stoicism and it goes without saying that there are much more qualified commentators out there but this here is my little hobby which I enjoy putting together for my local group- the Brisbane Stoics. This caveat is not to discourage you from enjoying my presentation but to remind you to fact check what I’ve said, and also as a reminder that as an amateur there is nothing here that is not available in the public domain for any interested student to discover for themselves. If anything my goal is to share my interest in Stoicism and to suggest that you too can follow the meandering trails that intertwine the fascinating ways and byways that traverse the Stoic philosophical worldview. It’s easy enough to begin a journey starting with some aspect of Stoic logic and following that trail find yourself soon deep in the woods of Stoic physics, only to pop out further along in some verdant ethical vein of inquiry. So, lets jump into the text before I get distracted further.
[1] For a rational being, only what is contrary to nature is unendurable, while anything that is reasonable can be endured. [2] Blows are not by nature unendurable. — ‘How so?’ — Look at it in this way: Spartans will put up with a beating in the knowledge that it is a reasonable punishment. [3] — ‘But to be hanged, isn’t that past bearing?’ — When someone feels it to be reasonable, though, he’ll go off and hang himself. [4] In short, if we look with due care, we’ll find that there is nothing by which the rational creature is so distressed as by that which is contrary to reason, and that, conversely, there is nothing to which he is so attracted as that which is reasonable.
Given our nature, that of rational beings, it follows that so long as something appears rational to us then it is something we are much more likely to be able to accept and to make sense of. In the case of the Spartans it was rational to them and reasonable even to undergo physical discipline but if we were expected to undergo the same treatment we would not merely complain and bemoan the injustice of the experience but we would likely fall apart. Our view that such treatment is not the kind of thing we should be submitted to, that it is not reasonable treatment, makes our experience of a whipping much more devastating for us. This sounds like the set up for some sort of relativism but it sets the scene for the rest of the discourse. If it were a relativism we might expect the advice to be that we should, through some kind of mental technique, make all irrational things rational in order then to make them bearable to us. This immediately becomes absurd- and despite the fact that there is a tendency towards relativistic thinking in the Western moral mindset we recognise that concern for the safety and welfare of the individual makes any account that rationalises harm likely to meet fierce resistance. But what about suicide, after all that results in harm to the individual and is a difficult issue for people to account for. As we all know- a person where they see no other solution, where it seems reasonable to do so- may go on to hang themselves, whereas for others who have never experienced such intolerable conditions at which point all hope escapes them- they find such an option irrational and very difficult to comprehend.
As an alternative to a setup for an argument that there is no rational ground by which we can base our assessments of reasonableness, we might instead consider that the apparent relativity arises despite a rational ground. It is precisely because the beliefs that underpin our choices are grounded in reason that it appears rational to the one who holds the view. In fact, when a belief fails to accord with the standards of reasonableness set by our beliefs the consequences are taken as intolerable.
[5] But these concepts of the reasonable and unreasonable mean different things to different people, as do those of good and bad, and the profitable and unprofitable. [6] It is for that reason above all that we have need of education, so as to be able to apply our preconceptions of what is reasonable and unreasonable to particular cases in accordance with nature. [7] Now, to determine what is reasonable or unreasonable, not only do we have to form a judgement about the value of external things, but we also have to judge how they stand in relation to our own specific character.
As Nussbaum notes in her ‘therapy of desire’ a belief can be descriptively rational (based on cognitions) but independently either true or false. So perhaps we can approach the text as having for its topic, things that are descriptively rational, such as beliefs and opinions that make claims about what is true or false, good or bad, whilst at the same time being either normatively rational or not. The distinction here between normative reasoning and otherwise, is in the correctness of the use of reason. So, in this case a person can have a set of beliefs which are descriptively rational and is able to make conclusions about the world, that from a Stoic point of view, are irrational. The person well educated in the use of reason will be expected to be able to know how to live according to reason, that is to make normative selections, knowing what is in fact good and bad and not merely accepting the conclusions offered by the uneducated, untrained or uncritical use of reason.
It is worth pointing out that in Nussbaum’s observation, regarding the distinction between normative and descriptive rationality, she is specifically describing emotion. But regardless, the same process is likely at play here in this discourse. This is the case given that emotions are taken by the Stoics not as merely irrational but as based on descriptively rational processes, that is beliefs about things. Rather it is the character of these beliefs that decide their overall status as rational or irrational.
At this juncture you might be tempted to say, “hang on what does this particular discourse have to do with emotion?” What particularly interests me about the Stoic description of emotion is that emotion is viewed as the affective output of a certain type of belief. As just described, beliefs are descriptively rational and just because some types of belief are in effect emotions does not exclude from our rational assessment of normativity. In fact, it may even be the case, that the appearance of certain types of emotion are indicative of the improper use of reason and therefore translated into Stoic psychology, the tendency of certain types of emotions to appear in a person’s experience is a symptom of disorder. The person habitually misuses reason and ultimately makes ‘irrational’ assessments about the nature of things, the objective value of externals and of their own place in the world. In short, this failure to adequately assess reason prevents a person from living in accord with Nature, which has negative consequences for one’s own rational development which encompasses their psychological and moral health. Living in accord with Reason is not merely an act of obedience as we will find from Epictetus’ discussion regarding preconceptions. It recognises that we as rational beings- living in a rationally ordered cosmos have within us the same principles and processes that govern the universe at large. By identifying within our own individual nature these principles we can align our own activity such that it accords with macrocosmic Nature, and given that from the Stoic point of view Nature is the equivalent of God, by pursuing above all things the knowledge of the correct use of reason, we are then living pious lives. This way of thinking about the text brings us to one of the key themes indicated by Gill in his introduction to the Hard translation “the idea that these capacities form key distinctive features of human nature within the framework of a divinely shaped universe.”
In this section Epictetus has just now introduced us to an important idea, that within us are innate concepts of good and bad which are grounded in universal reason. As explained by A. A. Long “[Epictetus’] essential point is that everyone is innately equipped with a moral sense, or rather a shared stock of general concepts that furnish the basic capacity for making objective discriminations between good and bad, and so on. Because people naturally have this endowment, they tend to think… that they know the specifics of goodness and happiness, or right and wrong, and can therefore make correct value judgements in particular cases.” p. 80.
The problem we run into is articulating these preconceptions to fit with specific instances. As Epictetus points out, the general sense that we know what is good and bad gives us a false confidence in being able to say with accuracy whether specific situations are in fact good or bad. And to make matters worse, this false confidence meets other conditions in the world that make the task of using reason appropriately even more difficult. These complications according to the discourse concern having to form “judgement about the value of external things, but we also have to judge how they stand in relation to our own specific character.”
In discourses 1.1 we discussed Epictetus’ formulation of the Stoic view, that we should be concerned only with what is within our own power, and its consequence for those things not in our power. From such a perspective external things have no intrinsic moral value and cannot legitimately be placeholders for objective values. In short, external things are in themselves neither good nor bad. But nonetheless most if not all of us form attachments to the contrary belief and come to see external things as valuable in themselves and assent to such makes them sources of motivation. The Stoic view is that such beliefs alter our character, shaping our disposition, truncating our rational and therefore moral development and exposing us to inevitable misfortune and ruin. More can be said about the conditions that make accurate judgement more difficult, but let’s proceed with the text with the idea of Normative reason in mind, and with the idea that what is being discussed has to do with the potential of the rational human subject to live well given that the capacity to do so is already built into us.
[8] It is thus reasonable for one person to hold out a chamber pot for another simply in view of the fact that, if he fails to do so, he’ll get a beating and no food, but will suffer no rough or painful treatment if he does hold it; [9] whereas, for another person, it won’t just seem intolerable to hold out a pot himself, but even to allow someone else to do so for him. [10] If you ask me, then, ‘Shall I hold out the pot or not?’, I’ll reply that it is of greater value to get food than not to get it, and a worse thing to be beaten than not to be beaten, so if you measure your interests by these standards, you should go and hold out the pot. [11] ‘Yes, but that would be beneath me.’ It is for you to take that further point into consideration, not me, since you’re the one who knows yourself, and knows what value you set on yourself, and at what price you’ll sell yourself; for different people sell themselves at different prices.
Here Epictetus offers us a clear account of the preconception of what is better and what is worse. It is better (we would all agree) to not be hungry and to not get as beating. But Epictetus raises an important question, at least for the Stoics, regarding the value of what is up to us, what is our proper area of concern, namely our use of belief and its relation to our own character. It is implied here that what is up to us also involves working out how preconceptions should be applied to specific situations such that they improve or at least do not compromise ones character. The correct us of preconceptions has to do with understanding that in all cases the right use will never compromise character even if that means one is exposed to physical deprivation or discomfort, or the loss of other externally dependent items such as wealth, popular esteem or status. Although, from a common sense perspective this may seem harsh, it again shows the rational consistency of Stoicism and the congruency of its apparent parts of physics, ethics and logic. For that part of the individual which is a trace of the larger cosmic whole, the preconceptions in themselves are identical with the kinds of processes that bind the cosmos together into a functioning, living, coordinated whole. There is a consistency and reliability at work here that seems to be lacking in the common sense view or rather common conception of what is good and bad. And it goes a step further than that, its consistency comes by making the rational individual a part of the whole and provides consolation and succour that far outweighs that which an individual as an isolated ego can achieve. Here we have both a coherent rational account of being and at the same time a remedy for existential angst.
Epictetus now gives some examples of classic Stoic responses to the topic at hand-
[ 12 ] That’s why, when Florus was considering whether he should attend Nero’s show to perform some part in it himself, Agrippinus said to him, ‘Go!’; [13] and when Florus asked him, ‘Then why aren’t you going yourself?’, he replied, ‘Because I’ve never even considered it.’ [14] For as soon as anyone begins to consider such questions, assessing and comparing the values of external things, he comes near to being one of those people who have lost all sense of their proper character. [15] What are you asking me, then? ‘Is death or life to be regarded as preferable?’ I answer: Life. [16] ‘Pain or pleasure?’ I answer: Pleasure. ‘But if I don’t agree to play a role in the tragedy, I’ll lose my head.’ [17] Go and play that role then, but I won’t play one. ‘Why?’ Because you regard yourself as being just one thread among all the threads in the tunic. ‘So what follows?’ You should consider how you can be like other people, just as one thread doesn’t want to be marked out from all the other threads. [ 18 ] But for my part, I want to be the purple, the small gleaming band that makes all the rest appear splendid and beautiful. Why do you tell me, then, to ‘be like everything else’? In that case, how shall I still be the purple? [ 19 ] Helvidius Priscus saw this too, and having seen it, acted upon it. When Vespasian sent word to him to tell him not to attend a meeting of the Senate, he replied, ‘It lies in your power not to allow me to be a senator, but as long as I remain one, I have to attend its meetings.’ [20] — ‘Well, if you do attend, hold your tongue.’ — ‘If you don’t ask for my opinion, I’ll hold my tongue.’ — ‘But I’m bound to ask you.’ — ‘And I for my part must reply as I think fit.’ [21] — ‘But if you do, I’ll have you executed.’ — ‘Well, when have I ever claimed to you that I’m immortal? You fulfil your role, and I’ll fulfil mine. It is yours to have me killed, and mine to die without a tremor; it is yours to send me into exile, and mine to depart without a qualm.’ [22] What good, you ask, did Priscus achieve, then, being just a single individual? And what does the purple achieve for the tunic? What else than standing out in it as purple, and setting a fine example for all the rest? [23] Another man, if he’d been told by Caesar to stay away from the Senate in such circumstances, would have replied, ‘Thank you for excusing me.’ [24] But Caesar wouldn’t have tried to stop such a man from going to the Senate in the first place, knowing that he would either sit there like a jug, or else, if he did speak, would say exactly what he knew Caesar would want him to say, piling on plenty more in addition.
The examples offered by Epictetus are a good example of one of the themes Christopher Gill encourages us to notice in the text- “Our capacity for ethical (especially social) development.” From the examples we can see that the Stoics injunction to live according to nature includes not only our rational commitments but also our social ones. Accordingly, proper rational conduct in the social sphere is given as a guide to life and as a way of responding to adversity. Often critics of Stoicism will say that the Stoics choose to take a passive approach to adversity and fail to stand up for justice. But in this example that is clearly not the case. The Stoic, understanding that to be concerned with oneself means to be concerned with what is in his power is committed to maintaining his character despite the activities of others around him. Whereas others might feel powerless to respond to the tyrant the Stoic shows equanimity and carries out his commitments despite the threats to his life, as he knows full well that although his life might be in danger his commitment to virtue and his overall well being is not. In this manner he becomes ‘kingly’ which is represented by the purple stripe. In one way this is the perfect response and demonstration of resistance to earthly power, by showing to the tyrant the manner of which every rational being has within it the capacity to be free from all forms of control and coercion. The soul of the Stoic is an inner citadel that no external tyrant can penetrate. This theme appears in the immortal poetry of Boethius, who was clearly influenced by the Stoics and through his own response to adversity became that gleaming band, making the whole so much more beautiful and setting a fine example for the rest of us-
“He who hungers for power must learn
To tame that dangerous appetite;
He must never bend his neck to the heavy
Yoke of that pernicious lust.
All India may quake at his name
And Ultima Thule forward its tribute,
But close at hand, by day and night,
Misery and terror attend him
To mock both him and his powerless power.”
-Boethius, The Consolation of philosophy.
The symbol of the purple stripe becomes the true strength of the Stoic in his dealing with the appearance of worldly power. On the one hand he knows what is up to him and his own character is never in danger and on the other he has been given an opportunity to fulfill a social obligation, to point out that each of us is a site of resistance to which every tyrant is powerless. In doing so the Stoic is being an exemplar to others, and not in some abstract intellectual way but making his life a demonstration of the kind of ‘kingly’ power given to us by our connection with the gods, in other words the rational faculty of which its correct use entails freedom from coercion and control and all misfortune.
This theme of ‘kingliness’ and of false power also directs us back to our earlier discussion concerning those complications which appear to frustrate our understanding and use of preconceptions.
In Margaret Graver’s book ‘Stoicism and Emotion” (2007), she outlines a twofold cause that appears to be responsible for “the regular occurrence of certain specific kinds of error, namely, strong or uncompromising evaluations of such external objects as money, pleasure, fame and their opposites.” p. 153. Graver provides this summary from Diogenes Laertius-
“The rational animal is corrupted sometimes by the persuasiveness of things from without, sometimes through the teaching of our associates. For the starting points which nature provides are uncorrupted”
So, to unpack, the twofold cause- those which misleads us from our uncorrupted starting point- related to the appearance of things on the one hand and on the other to what we are taught by our parents, friends, teachers, the media and society in general.
Of the first it is argued that the things that are good for us are often accompanied by feelings of pleasure. This occurrence of pleasure is incidental to what is good and the account offered in Cicero’s On Ends has his Stoic Spokesman Cato denying “that infants have any natural commitments to pleasure for its own sake; instead, what one has from birth is only an orientation to one’s own constitution; that is, a sense of attachment to one’s natural way of functioning, both physically and psychologically, and a preference for the kinds of objects that tend to preserve it” p. 152.
The issue of confusion and the corruption of our ‘pure’ starting point- which I am taking to be synonymous with Epictetus’ preconceptions, arises when the developing human fails to distinguish between what is good for oneself- that is what meets the needs of ones own constitution- and the feeling of pleasure that often accompanies it. When this happens over time the distinction between the two items is lost and they are conflated resulting in problematic consequences for our ability to judge the worth of external things. In this way we are conditioned to see pleasure or riches, or glory as the good, and the worthwhile goal of activity, at the expense of Virtue, which necessarily requires us to orient to the objective value of externals and to make use of them accordingly.
The goal of human life as being towards the attainment of rational ends is subsumed by the pursuit of pleasure and taken as an end in itself is ruinous to moral character because it compromises the autonomy of the governing faculty, and betrays ones commitments to ones nature as a rational-social being. This of course means that from the Stoic perspective- which takes our individual selves to be a part of the whole- we not only harm our own character, but we also mislead others and become part of the perverting twofold cause. Furthermore, given the unreliability of external things in securing happiness we begin to find fault in our experience of the world and fail to appreciate the wonder of life. That rational part which marks us out as unique and is equivalent to a divine spark, is neglected and cheapened. We become like animals responding automatically to stimulus with response. How could nature not be offended, and if not capable of offense then perhaps we might say that nature is wasted in us, and in the sense that nature is wasted and not brought to its proper use, then surely it is harmed. This is the kind of gravity that the Stoics place of the right use of reason.
But I was actually interested in talking about the ‘kingly’ connotation of the purple stripe and its relation to the twofold cause. Calcidius, who is writing in the 4th Century, and therefore later than Epictetus, also discussing the twofold cause agrees that the association between meeting the requirements of one’s constitution and pleasure brings about a “natural belief that everything sweet and pleasurable is good, and that what brings pain is bad and ought to be avoided” (Graver, 2007, p. 156).
Calcidius extends this side of the twofold cause showing how it is in his view, that people come to displace Virtue as the proper goal-
“As [people] mature, they retain this belief that everything nice is good, even if not useful, and that everything troublesome, even if it brings some advantage is bad. Consequently, they love riches, which are the foremost means of obtaining pleasure, and they embrace glory rather than honour. For humans are by nature inclined to pursue praise and honour, since honour is the testimony to virtue. But those who are wise and engaged in the study of wisdom know what sort of virtue they ought to cultivate, while people do not know about things and so cultivate glory, that is, popular esteem, in place of honour. And in place of virtue they pursue a life steeped in pleasures, believing that the power to do what one wants is the superiority of a king. For humans are by nature kingly, and since power always accompanies kingship, they suppose that kingship likewise accompanies power…
Similarly, since the happy person necessarily enjoys life, they think that those who live pleasurably will be happy. Such, I think, is the error which arises ‘from things’ to possess the human mind.” p. 156.
Calcidius’s commentary makes for a fitting comparison with Epictetus use of the ‘purple stripe’.
Not only does our natural goal to preserve our constitution and its accidental association with pleasure often become an issue but also humans have other natural goals that can likewise become associated with other externally contingent experiences. On this Graver’s (2007) says-
“Part of our native endowment is a predilection for mastery, which motivates us to assume control over our surroundings. But not every exercise of power is a manifestation of the human being’s proper controlling role; rather power supervenes on that role just as pleasure supervenes on the flourishing condition.
Where honour and glory are concerned there is an additional level of confusion to be sorted out. Humans are by nature inclined to pursue praise and honour, for honour, says Calcidius is “the testimony to virtue”: it has a reliable connection to virtuous action and for that reason constitutes a legitimate object of choice. But humans frequently make the mistake of cultivating another form of praise which is here called “glory” or “popular esteem,” deceived apparently by the resemblance between justified and unjustified praise. Thus popular esteem stands at two removes from the real source of value: honour is derived from virtue, and popular esteem is then confused with honour.” p. 157.
Clearly Epictetus desire to be the ‘purple stripe’ is the normatively rational expression of his understanding that mastery is concerned with oneself, and the use of what is up to us and has nothing to do with the desire for worldly power often associated with rulership. To be the ‘purple stripe’ in Epictetus’ analogy involves the clear differentiation of natural goals from qualities or states of experience that accidentally co-occur. This act of conscious recognition of the true goals of the rational being, captures the essence of mastery, as mastery over appearances. Mastery is simply just the natural state of the rational human being who successfully makes the use of reason his conscious priority. Epictetus’ is here educating us about the importance between knowing the distinction between the correct use of one’s natural capacities and falling for the persuasive appearance of things.
I have spent some time on this point as I think it’s worth contemplating. This idea that the wrong objects are often valued due to their supervening on other natural goals, raises questions about the health of the values that motivate our ordinary everyday behaviour. Psychologists in various cognitivist schools refer to values as “activities that give our lives meaning” (LeJeune & Luoma, 2019) and are sometimes described as being part of an inner compass that directs us toward a flourishing life. From a Stoic reading this approach may be problematic, in that our values may in fact be toward valuing the wrong objects, those items that become associated with our natural goals and can clearly become stand-ins for the activity that is normatively required. In this sense, if the Stoics are correct then psychologists and those in the helping professions, who uncritically help their clients to identify with and valorise their values may in fact be just another corrupting voice, part of the twofold cause that perpetuates the delusion that external things can provide a flourishing life. The Stoic psychologist on the other hand would help the client in their examination of impressions, to learn to see that what they desire may in fact be a corrupted distortion of the normatively desirable object.
I have wondered a bit from the text, but that’s ok. My intention is not to produce content that follows a strict flow typical of much academic writing. As I mentioned earlier Stoicism to me is a vast interconnected field of thought, of which each stop in the path has something interesting to teach. It is a kind of rotation of a view that shows often hidden aspects- and by wondering slowly along these paths we are often struck by the ways in which one path leads on to another and how certain byways take us past different natural features of the philosophical terrain.
Now back to discourses 1.2
[25] It is in this way that a certain athlete behaved too, when he was in danger of dying if his genitals weren’t cut off. His brother (who was a philosopher) came to him and said, ‘Well brother, what are you planning to do? Are we to cut off this part of you and go to the gymnasium as usual?’ But the athlete wouldn’t submit to that, but set his mind against it and died. [26] When someone asked, ‘How did he do that? Was it as an athlete or as a philosopher?’, Epictetus replied: As a man, and as a man who had been proclaimed as victor at Olympia, and had fought his corner there, and had passed his life in such places, rather than merely having oil smeared over him at Baton’s training ground. [27] But another man would be willing even to have his head cut off, if it were possible for him to live without a head. [28] This is what is meant by acting according to one’s character, and such is the weight that this consideration acquires among those who make a habit of introducing it into their deliberations. [29] ‘Come now, Epictetus, shave off your beard.’ If I’m a philosopher, I’ll reply: I won’t shave it off. ‘Then I’ll have you beheaded.’ If it pleases you to do so, have me beheaded.
Regarding the athlete, Epictetus points out that he died as a man, indicating (as Hard’s commentary also notes) that the man’s genitals are inextricably linked with his nature as a man. His point that some would go so far as to live without their head if it would preserve their life, goes to the observation that Epictetus is making that some wisely know the value of preserving their own Natures and will not be coerced into defacing it, whereas others will do whatever it takes, perverting themselves and defacing nature in themselves out of a false belief that doing so is a better course of action than death. The Stoics of course prefer life over death but given the choice of living a life in which one’s rational autonomy is surrendered and the possibility of a virtuous life with it the Stoics, like Socrates would rather choose death- the lesser of the two evils. In fact, death in the face of the alternative option, an ignominious life is not an evil at all but perhaps a godsend as Socrates himself declares at his trial –
“If thus it [my execution] is pleasing to the gods, thus let it be’ (Plato, Crito, 43d).
And elsewhere he reminds his audience-
“No harm can come to the good man in life or in death, and his circumstances are not ignored by the gods” (Plato, Apology 41d).
Perhaps we might think that Epictetus’ refusal to allow his beard to be removed is excessive, and perhaps he is merely making a rhetorical point. But in the Roman culture of the time, beards had become associated with philosophers, so Epictetus’ point may be that the removal of his beard even as a symbolic rejection of his commitment to wisdom was untenable to him. The implication is that for someone like himself, who holds Virtue as the only thing of value, he will not budge an inch. As he says earlier in the discourse “[14] For as soon as anyone begins to consider such questions, assessing and comparing the values of external things, he comes near to being one of those people who have lost all sense of their proper character.” Epictetus is clearly telling us that for the person genuinely committed to virtue will not stop to consider the pros and cons of compromising activity. It is immediately clear to the Stoic and reflexively so as he has internalised the doctrine, that externals have no inherent value in themselves and where we are called to entertain them as items of real value, then they must be rejected immediately.
[30] Someone asked, ‘Then how will each of us come to recognize what is appropriate to his own character?’ How is it, replied Epictetus, that when a lion attacks, the bull alone is aware of its own might, and hurls itself forward on behalf of the entire herd? Isn’t it clear that the possession of such power is accompanied at the same time by an awareness of that power? [31] And in our case too, if someone possesses such power, he won’t fail to be aware of it. [32] And yet a bull doesn’t become a bull all at once, any more than a man acquires nobility of mind all at once; no, he must undergo hard winter training, and so make himself ready, rather than hurl himself without proper thought into what is inappropriate for him. [33] Only, consider at what price you’re willing to sell your power of choice. If nothing else, make sure, man, that you don’t sell it cheap.
But what is great and exceptional is perhaps the province of others, of Socrates and people of that kind. [34]
‘Why is it, then, if we are fitted by nature to act in such a way, all or many of us don’t behave like that?’
What, do all horses become swift-running, or all dogs quick on the scent? [35] And then, because I’m not naturally gifted, shall I therefore abandon all effort to do my best? Heaven forbid. [ 36 ] Epictetus won’t be better than Socrates; but even if I’m not too bad, that is good enough for me. [37] For I won’t ever be a Milo either, and yet I don’t neglect my body; nor a Croesus, and I don’t neglect my property; nor in general do I cease to make any effort in any regard whatever merely because I despair of achieving perfection.
Epictetus view on the topic of training and progress comes to the fore here. Constant reflection on the manner in which we use impressions and the study of Stoic philosophy will help us to make progress along the path to Virtue as conceived by the Stoics. As A.A. Long observes regarding Epictetus’ approach-
“We need Stoic doctrine in order to learn that conventional goods such as health or wealth are not strictly good nor their opposites strictly bad because they are not unequivocally profitable or harmful respectively, or to learn that happiness does not consist in a succession of pleasurable sensations and an absence of painful ones. Our preconceptions need to be articulated by definitions far more precise than their ‘innate’ content involves; and we need unremitting training in order to make our conduct consonant with these refinements.” p. 82.
But the view seemingly held by Epictetus is that progress can be made and that once it is made it will become evident. Just as the Bull knows its own strength, the Stoic will also know his own when facing adversity. He will have internalised the view to such a degree that it does not even occur to him to consider external things as worthwhile items for consideration. His character, the views he takes, his response to impression, his character, these are the things that concern him and are not the kinds of things that he weighs against infinitely inferior alternatives.
But what of the student who is afraid that he will never be completely free of vice? Who seems to think that the Stoic doctrine demands too much, and that he lacks the inner resources to completely fulfil such a commitment. Epictetus is entirely generous here, he knows how difficult it is to live as a Stoic with the kind of vigilance required to consistently reject the persuasive appearance of false goods. We get the impression that his student here is a young man and that young people are often dissuaded from practice if perfection is not on the immediate horizon. With maturity we realise that sometimes it’s not perfection that’s needed but the desire to keep working on things, especially where those things concern the preservation of our natural constitution. It is likely that if the student can be encouraged to continue the work, internalising the lessons and mastering the doctrine that his life will be immeasurably improved. And although he may not become a sage, he may yet become an exemplar the kind of person we can look up to when guidance is needed.
In closing, Stoic philosophy offers an important critique to worldviews, like our own, that often identifies the goal of life with external acquisition and achievement. I am of the opinion that we are desperately in need of such a critique and way of life given the ubiquity of the voices, both lay and expert that corroborate the view that externals can reliably lead to a happy flourishing life.
In our Brisbane Stoics meetup in February, we started exploring the Discourses.
In this video, I outline the core concepts of 1.1
Concerning what is in our power and what is not
Discourses: Hard Translation-
Introduction
“In 1.1 Epictetus begins by presenting the reasoning faculty as the one which, unlike other arts and faculties, comprehends both itself and the other faculties. He then isolates one salient aspect of this faculty, ‘which enables us to make right use of our impressions’, which encapsulates this combination of self-management and management of other things. The latter capacity is described, by contrast with our bodily condition, possessions, and personal relationships, as the only thing that is wholly ‘up to us’ or ‘within our power’ ( eph’ hēmin ). This idea is presented by saying that this capacity (which is ‘a portion’ of divinity) is the only one that Zeus, king of the gods, could place wholly within our power (10–13, expressed as a speech by Zeus).
Epictetus goes on to maintain that, typically, we misuse this capacity; we concern ourselves with the things that are not ‘up to us’ (possessions and so on). Instead, we should ‘make the best of what lies within our power and deal with everything else as it comes’. This recommendation is then illustrated by a series of imagined dialogues, some of them involving historical figures, including famous Stoicism-inspired examples of resistance to tyrannical attitudes or actions by Roman emperors. Each of these is designed to show what is involved in ‘making the best of what lies within our power’, and at the same time ‘dealing with everything else’ as regards our body or continued life — ‘as it comes’. These examples show, as he points out, ‘what it means to train oneself in the matters in which one ought to train oneself’” p. xxii.
A.A. Long, ‘Epictetus a Stoic and Socratic guide to Life’ p. 27.
Four principal concepts give Epictetus’ philosophy its unity and coherence: freedom, judgement, volition, and integrity.
Freedom
The freedom that interests Epictetus is entirely psychological and attitudinal. It is freedom from being constrained or impeded by any external circumstance or emotional reaction. He diagnoses unhappiness as subservience to persons, happenings, values, and bodily conditions, all of which involve the individual subject in surrendering autonomy and becoming a victim to debilitating emotions. Happiness, by contrast, is unimpededness, doing and experiencing only what you want to do and experience, serenity, absence of any sense that things might be better for you than you find them to be.
Judgement
The basis for this ideal of freedom brings us to the second core concept, JUDGEMENT. Following his Stoic authorities, Epictetus regards all mental states, including emotions, as conditioned by judgements… On this model of mind, there is no such thing as a purely reactive emotion or at least a reaction that we cannot, on reflection, control. How we experience the world, and how we experience ourselves, depends through and through on the judgements we form, judgements about the structure of the world, the necessary conditions of human life, goodness, badness, and, above all, what is psychologically ‘up to us’. The crucial idea is that we do not experience the world without the mediation of our own assessments.
This rationalistic analysis of emotions and evaluations implies that they themselves, and the judgements on which they depend, are completely in our power, up to us, within the control of our will.
Volition
The crucial idea is that volition is what persons are in terms of their mental faculties, consciousness, character, judgements, goals, and desires: volition is the self, what each of us is, as abstracted from the body…
You and I are not our bodies, nor even do we own our bodies. We, our essential selves, are our volitions. In that domain, and only in that domain, we have the possibility of freedom…
What is required of anyone who wants genuine freedom is to transfer all wants, values, and attachments away from externals and situate them within the scope of one’s volition. Prohairesis or volition is the locus of all that truly matters to humans who have understood cosmic order and their own natures and capacities. Its perfection is the human good, and the goal of Epictetus’ teaching.
Like earlier Stoics, he holds that goodness and badness in the strict sense pertain only to what accords or fails to accord with our essential human nature: that is to say, our nature as rational animals. A perfected volition, then, is good in this strict sense, and no other objective is comparably deserving. Consequently, everything that falls outside the individual’s volition, including family, status, country, the condition of one’s body, material prosperity-all of these are inessential to its perfection and the freedom or happiness that this perfection constitutes. Not only are these things inessential, but also attachment to them is a certain recipe for disappointment, anxiety, and unhappiness.
Integrity
I use this word to translate a cluster of terms Epictetus repeatedly uses that can be rendered by such words as shame, reverence, trustworthiness, conscience, decency. Integrity is as much a part of Epictetus’ normative self as a good volition; in fact, it is not distinct from a good volition but the way that that mental disposition is disposed in relation to other persons…
Volition, as one’s self, is where one’s interests lie. It determines what one calls ‘I’ and ‘mine’. A good volition, because it values itself over everything else, includes integrity; it treats integrity as essential to its own interests. Integrity involves honouring all of one’s ties to kin, social roles, and other acquired relationships…
[Epictetus] is a moralist, not because he sets out from a position ·with regard to our duties to other persons, but because his bedrock principle of cultivating the self as a good volition entails uncompromising integrity (respect, cooperation, justice, and kindliness) with respect to every human being one encounters or is by family or circumstance related to.
Will Johncock- ‘Beyond the Individual’.
We are a trace of the whole rationality (quote p. 49)
BOOK 1 Epictetus ‘Discourses’
1.1 About things that are within our power and those that are not
[1] Among all the arts and faculties, you’ll find none that can take itself as an object of study, and consequently none that can pass judgement of approval or disapproval upon itself. [2] In the case of grammar, how far does its power of observation extend? Only as far as to pass judgement on what is written. And in the case of music? Only as far as to pass judgement on the melody. [3] Does either of them, then, make itself an object of study? Not at all. If you’re writing to a friend, grammar will tell you what letters you ought to choose, but as to whether or not you ought to write to your friend, grammar won’t tell you that. And the same is true of music with regard to melodies; as to whether or not you should sing or play the lyre at this time, that is something that music won’t tell you. [4] What will tell you, then? The faculty that takes both itself and everything else as an object of study. And what is that? The faculty of reason. For that alone of all the faculties that we’ve been granted is capable of understanding both itself — what it is, what it is capable of, and what value it contributes — and all the other faculties too. [5] For what else is it that tells us that gold is beautiful? For the gold itself doesn’t tell us. It is clear, then, that this is the faculty that has the capacity to deal with impressions. [6] What else can judge music, grammar, and the other arts and faculties, and assess the use that we make of them, and indicate the proper occasions for their use? None other than this. [7] It was fitting, then, that the gods have placed in our power only the best faculty of all, the one that rules over all the others, that which enables us to make right use of our impressions; but everything else they haven’t placed within our power. [8] Was it that they didn’t want to? I think for my part that, if they could, they would have entrusted those other powers to us too; but that was something that they just couldn’t do. [9] For in view of the fact that we’re here on earth, and are shackled to a body like our own, and to such companions as we have, how could it be possible that, in view of all that, we shouldn’t be hampered by external things? [ 10 ] But what does Zeus * have to say about this? ‘If it had been possible, Epictetus, I would have ensured that your poor body and petty possessions were free and immune from hindrance. [11] But as things are, you mustn’t forget that this body isn’t truly your own, but is nothing more than cleverly moulded clay. [12] But since I couldn’t give you that, I’ve given you a certain portion of myself, this faculty of motivation to act and not to act, of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the power to make proper use of impressions; if you pay good heed to this, and entrust all that you have to its keeping, you’ll never be hindered, never obstructed, and you’ll never groan, never fi nd fault, and never fl atter anyone at all. [13] What, does all of that strike you as being of small account?’ Certainly not. ‘So you’re content with that?’ I pray so to the gods. [14] But as things are, although we have it in our power to apply ourselves to one thing alone, and devote ourselves to that, we choose instead to apply ourselves to many things, and attach ourselves to many, to our body, and our possessions, and our brother, and friend, and child, and slave. [15] And so, being attached in this way to any number of things, we’re weighed down by them and dragged down. [16] That is why, if the weather prevents us from sailing, we sit there in a state of anxiety, constantly peering around. ‘What wind is this?’ The North Wind. And what does it matter to us and to him? ‘When will the West Wind blow?’ When it so chooses, my good friend, or rather, when Aeolus chooses; for God hasn’t appointed you to be controller of the winds, he has appointed Aeolus. [17] What are we to do, then? To make the best of what lies within our power, and deal with everything else as it comes. ‘How does it come, then?’ As God wills. [18] ‘What, am I to be beheaded now, and I alone?’ Why, would you want everyone to be beheaded for your consolation? [ 19 ] Aren’t you willing to stretch out your neck as Lateranus did at Rome when Nero ordered that he should be beheaded? For he stretched out his neck, received the blow, and when it proved to be too weak, shrank back for an instant, but then stretched out his neck again. [ 20 ] And moreover, on an earlier occasion, when Epaphroditus * came to him and asked him why he had fallen out with the emperor, he replied, ‘If I care to, I’ll explain that to your master.’ [21] What, then, should we have at hand to help us in such emergencies? Why, what else than to know what is mine and what isn’t mine, and what is in my power and what isn’t? [22] I must die; so must I die groaning too? I must be imprisoned; so must I grieve at that too? I must depart into exile; so can anyone prevent me from setting off with a smile, cheerfully and serenely? ‘Tell me the secrets.’ [23] I won’t reveal them; for that lies within my power. ‘Then I’ll have you chained up.’ What are you saying, man, chain me up? You can chain my leg, but not even Zeus can overcome my power of choice. [24] ‘I’ll throw you into prison.’ You mean my poor body. ‘I’ll have you beheaded.’ Why, did I ever tell you that I’m the only man to have a neck that can’t be severed? [25] These are the thoughts that those who embark on philosophy ought to refl ect upon; it is these that they should write about day after day, and it is in these that they should train themselves. [ 26 ] Thrasea * was in the habit of saying, ‘I’d rather be killed today than be sent into exile tomorrow.’ [ 27 ] So what did Rufus * say in reply? ‘If you choose death as being the heavier misfortune, what a foolish choice that is; if you choose it as being the lighter, who has granted you that choice? Aren’t you willing to be content with what is granted to you?’ [ 28 ] So what was it that Agrippinus * used to say? ‘I won’t become an obstacle to myself.’ The news was brought to him that ‘your case is being tried in the Senate’. [29] — ‘May everything go well! But the fi fth hour has arrived’ — this was the hour in which he was in the habit of taking his exercise and then having a cold bath — ‘so let’s go off and take some exercise.’ [30] When he had completed his exercise, someone came and told him, ‘You’ve been convicted.’ — ‘To exile,’ he asked, ‘or to death?’ — ‘To exile.’ — ‘What about my property?’ — ‘It hasn’t been confi scated.’ — ‘Then let’s go away to Aricia and eat our meal there.’ [31] This is what it means to train oneself in the matters in which one ought to train oneself, to have rendered one’s desires incapable of being frustrated, and one’s aversions incapable of falling into what they want to avoid. [32] I’m bound to die. If at once, I’ll go to my death; if somewhat later, I’ll eat my meal, since the hour has arrived for me to do so, and then die afterwards. And how? As suits someone who is giving back that which is not his own.
Gorgias– Plato.
SOCRATES: I believe that I’m one of a few Athenians—so as not to say I’m the only one, but the only one among our contemporaries—to take up the true political craft and practice the true politics. This is because the speeches I make on each occasion do not aim at gratification but at what’s best. They don’t aim at what’s most pleasant. And because I’m not willing to do those clever things you recommend, I won’t know what to say in court. And the same account I applied to Polus comes back to me. For I’ll be judged the way a doctor would be judged by a jury of children if a pastry chef were to bring accusations against him. Think about what a man like that, taken captive among these people, could say in his defense, if somebody were to accuse him and say, “Children, this man has worked many great evils on you, yes, on you. He destroys the youngest among you by cutting and burning them, and by slimming them down and choking them he confuses them. He gives them the most bitter potions to drink and forces hunger and thirst on them. He doesn’t feast you on a great variety of sweets the way I do!”
What do you think a doctor, caught in such an evil predicament, could say? Or if he should tell them the truth and say, “Yes, children, I was doing all those things in the interest of health,” how big an uproar do you think such “judges” would make? Wouldn’t it be a loud one?
CALLICLES: Perhaps so.
SOCRATES: I should think so! Don’t you think he’d be at a total loss as to what he should say?
CALLICLES: Yes, he would be.
SOCRATES: That’s the sort of thing I know would happen to me, too, if I came into court. For I won’t be able to point out any pleasures that I’ve provided for them, ones they believe to be services and benefits, while I envy neither those who provide them nor the ones for whom they’re provided. Nor will I be able to say what’s true if someone charges that I ruin younger people by confusing them or abuse older ones by speaking bitter words against them in public or private. I won’t be able to say, that is, “Yes, I say and do all these things in the interest of justice, my ‘honored judges’”—to use that expression you people use—nor anything else. So presumably I’ll get whatever comes my way.
CALLICLES: Do you think, Socrates, that a man in such a position in his city, a man who’s unable to protect himself, is to be admired?
SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, as long as he has that one thing that you’ve often agreed he should have: as long as he has protected himself against having spoken or done anything unjust relating to either men or gods. For this is the self-protection that you and I often have agreed avails the most. Now if someone were to refute me and prove that I am unable to provide this protection for myself or for anyone else, I would feel shame at being refuted, whether this happened in the presence of many or of a few, or just between the two of us; and if I were to be put to death for lack of this ability, I really would be upset. But if I came to my end because of a deficiency in flattering oratory, I know that you’d see me bear my death with ease. For no one who isn’t totally bereft of reason and courage is afraid to die; doing what’s unjust is what he’s afraid of.
For to arrive in Hades with one’s soul stuffed full of unjust actions is the ultimate of all bad things. If you like, I’m willing to give you an account showing that this is so.
Conclusion
(following the letter)
Although this letter is an extreme case of taking Epictetus’ philosophy regarding ‘what is in our control’ to mean something that is definitely not intended, it is important to point out that such an observation is not entirely trivial. It is clearly possible that a modern Stoic readership, interpreting through the lens of self-help and positive forms of psychology may come to such a conclusion. As noted by Will Johncock in his recent book “Beyond the Individual” (2023)
“There is something shared between our mind and an entire universe and therefore between our mind and other human’s minds. This unsettles straightforward oppositional distinctions between what is supposedly internal versus external to the self. Such considerations might duly spark discussions that unsettle the branding of stoicism as a tool that individuals can use to mentally defy an anxiety inducing ‘out there’ world. There is a voracious appetite in the self-help market for reductions of Stoic philosophy to assertions around mental self-definition and personal control. Such adaptions must be complemented though with the kind of reading… which appreciates that for the Stoics, your rational mind is dispersed in and among other people’s minds. If what is mental has shared roots and operations, then mental control is a collaborative exercise.” p. 49.
This idea, that our individual rationality is grounded beyond us collectively, or even in a universal form of rationality, what the Stoics call Reason, or Zeus, recalls Hard’s comment cited earlier, that
“Epictetus’ treatment sometimes has distinctive emphases. One is our capacity for rational agency, and a second our capacity for ethical (especially social) development; a third is the idea that these capacities form key distinctive features of human nature within the framework of a divinely shaped universe”.
Likewise, Pierre Hadot in his ‘philosophy as a way of life’ emphasises the uniqueness of the Stoic perspective, as an attempt to transform one’s consciousness above and beyond our individual and entirely subjectively concerned experience- by rejecting our instinctual tendency to accept on face value the appearance of things and rather to take an objective or cosmic view. Such a view takes the world to be a living cosmic animal of which we are a part. Reason as God is throughout the universe and for us to live according to virtue it is incumbent on us to see beyond immediate self-preserving appearances of things and live in ways that actualise our rational ends. Such an approach to life is the best defense against vicissitude and misfortune. We find Socrates himself making similar claims when he defends philosophy’s noble requirements in his arguments with Callicles-
SOCRATES: I believe that I’m one of a few Athenians—so as not to say I’m the only one, but the only one among our contemporaries—to take up the true political craft and practice the true politics. This is because the speeches I make on each occasion do not aim at gratification but at what’s best. They don’t aim at what’s most pleasant. And because I’m not willing
to do those clever things you recommend, I won’t know what to say in court. And the same account I applied to Polus comes back to me. For I’ll be judged the way a doctor would be judged by a jury of children if a pastry chef were to bring accusations against him. Think about what a man like that, taken captive among these people, could say in his defense, if somebody were to accuse him and say, “Children, this man has worked many great evils on you, yes, on you. He destroys the youngest among you by cutting and burning them, and by slimming them down and choking them he confuses them. He gives them the most bitter potions to drink and forces hunger and thirst on them. He doesn’t feast you on a great variety of sweets the way I do!”
What do you think a doctor, caught in such an evil predicament, could say? Or if he should tell them the truth and say, “Yes, children, I was doing all those things in the interest of health,” how big an uproar do you think such “judges” would make? Wouldn’t it be a loud one?
CALLICLES: Perhaps so.
SOCRATES: I should think so! Don’t you think he’d be at a total loss as to what he should say?
CALLICLES: Yes, he would be.
SOCRATES: That’s the sort of thing I know would happen to me, too, if I came into court. For I won’t be able to point out any pleasures that I’ve provided for them, ones they believe to be services and benefits, while I envy neither those who provide them nor the ones for whom they’re provided. Nor will I be able to say what’s true if someone charges that I ruin younger people by confusing them or abuse older ones by speaking bitter words against them in public or private. I won’t be able to say, that is, “Yes, I say and do all these things in the interest of justice, my ‘honored judges’”—to use that expression you people use—nor anything else. So presumably I’ll get whatever comes my way.
CALLICLES: Do you think, Socrates, that a man in such a position in his city, a man who’s unable to protect himself, is to be admired?
SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, as long as he has that one thing that you’ve often agreed he should have: as long as he has protected himself against having spoken or done anything unjust relating to either men or gods. For this is the self-protection that you and I often have agreed avails the most. Now if someone were to refute me and prove that I am unable to provide this protection for myself or for anyone else, I would feel shame at being refuted, whether this happened in the presence of many or of a few, or just between the two of us; and if I were to be put to death for lack of this ability, I really would be upset. But if I came to my end because of a deficiency in flattering oratory, I know that you’d see me bear my death with ease. For no one who isn’t totally bereft of reason and courage is afraid to die; doing what’s unjust is what he’s afraid of.
For to arrive in Hades with one’s soul stuffed full of unjust actions is the ultimate of all bad things. If you like, I’m willing to give you an account showing that this is so.
So although Epictetus’s prohairesis is concerned with the control that we have over the rational faculty, awareness of control is only part of the philosophical process. And following Socrates demonstration of his understanding that the best defense in life is not merely to live as long as possible, or to have as much wealth or success as possible, but to live a life that honours both Gods and Men. That is, to pay attention to oneself as a being whose own nature is grounded in universal reason- first and foremost- and whose own individuality is but a trace of the order and coherence of Reason that penetrates, motivates and vitalises the Cosmos throughout. From this perspective it might be argued that Stoicism aims to educate us in the correct use of reason in forming judgements about the value and use of things.